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THE UNAVOIDABLE ECCLESIASTICAL COLLISION IN
VIRGINIA
Isaac A. McBeth *
Jennifer R. Sykes **

Section 57-9(A) of the Code of Virginia is a statute that purports to resolve
church property disputes. There is, however, a significant amount of
controversy as to whether the statute encroaches on the free exercise rights of
hierarchical churches located in Virginia and enmeshes Virginia courts in the
ecclesiastical thicket. Given the debate surrounding Section 57-9(A) and the
controversial shift of several mainstream denominations in matters of
substantive church doctrine, Virginia is a fertile breeding ground for church
property disputes. Accordingly, the Commonwealth is in the midst of an
ecclesiastical crisis. The impact of the crisis is evidenced by the recent division
within the Episcopal Church’s Diocese of Virginia and the subsequent church
property litigation that ensued following the division.
This Comment examines the constitutional standards surrounding various
courses of action states may pursue to resolve church property disputes and
provides a specific analysis of Virginia’s statutory scheme for doing so.
Current Supreme Court of the United States precedent establishes that courts
have three constitutional options they can rely on in resolving church property
disputes. Courts may defer to the decision of the religious organization’s
adjudicatory body, a method of resolution known as the deference approach.
Courts may also decide the case on the basis of a neutral principle of law such
as property law or contact law. Finally, states may enact special statutes to
direct courts on how to resolve church property disputes. This article argues
that Section 57-9(A) does not operate as a constitutional method of resolving
church property disputes within the Supreme Court’s established framework

* J.D. Candidate, 2011, University of Richmond School of Law. The author specifically thanks
Professor Jessica Erickson, Professor Hank Chambers, Sheila Moheb, Jillian Malizio, David Tabakin,
and Erin Bender for their indispensable help in bringing this article to fruition. Additionally, the author
thanks the editors and staff of the Richmond Journal of Law and Public Interest for their hard work and
professionalism throughout the publication process.
** J.D. Candidate, 2012, University of Richmond School of Law; M.A. in Military Studies, Terrorism
Concentration, 2007, American Military University; B.A., 2003, University of Connecticut. She would
like to thank Professor Corinna Lain for her guidance, and Deans Michelle Rahman and Kristine
Henderson for their support. Personal thanks go to her parents; to her siblings Michael T. and Jeffrey;
and to Melissa Shafer, Andrea Castellani, and Mary Waters.

509

510

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:401

for doing so. Accordingly, due to the constitutional issues with Section 579(A), the law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path
leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision.
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INTRODUCTION
On a national and international scale—perhaps more so now than ever—
religious organizations are wrestling with difficult doctrinal questions
relating to abortion, homosexual marriage, and the willingness to ordain
homosexual ministers.1 Many religious bodies are starting to reconsider
their positions on these controversial matters. Several denominations have
shifted, if not completely reversed, their positions on these issues to the
great satisfaction of some and the great dismay of others.2 Indeed, the
country is facing an ecclesiastical crisis. This crisis hails the reemergence
of a legal issue that managed largely to disappear into the backdrop for
generations: church property disputes.
A significant number of churches receive the majority of their funding to
maintain and improve church property from the donations of its members.3
When those members disagree on significant issues of doctrine, the result
can be an internal schism within the church. Members sharing the same
perspective on a particular issue form opposing factions that wish to operate
independently of those members that maintain the opposite perspective.4
The question remains, however, as to which faction is entitled to possess
and use church property that has been funded by members of both factions.5
While the dispute amongst factions may sometimes be resolved by a
religious institution’s own internal tribunals, factions may also seek relief

1. Compare Jane Lampman, A Church’s Struggle Over Gay Marriage, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR,
Jul. 1, 2005, at 2, available at http://www.csmonitor.com/2005/0701/p02s01-ussc.html (noting that
mainline denominations take a strong position against gay marriage and leave the decision to individual
churches on whether or not to adopt the position), with Matt Slick, Christianity and Homosexuality,
CHRISTIAN APOLOGETICS & RESEARCH MINISTRY, http://carm.org/christianity-and-homosexuality
(advocating that Christians become more tolerant of homosexuality).
2. See SAMUEL KORANTENG-PIPIM, MUST WE BE SILENT? ISSUES DIVIDING OUR CHURCH, available at
http://www.drpipim.org/homosexuality-contemporaryissues-47/73-why-attitudes-are-changing-onhomosexuality-part-1.html (2001) (noting the changing attitudes on homosexuality by various
churches); see also Robert Nugent, The U.S. Catholic Bishops and Gay Civil Rights: Four Case Studies,
38 CATH. LAW 1 (1998).
3. John C. LaRue, Jr., Church Budgets and Income, YOUR CHURCH, Sept. 1, 2001, available at
http://www.christianitytoday.com/yc/2000/sepoct/12.128.html (stating that “the typical church counts on
tithes and offerings for 93 percent of its budget” and “[c]hurches with budgets greater than $500,000
depend less on tithes and offerings (87[percent] of income) than the average church”).
4. See Ann Rodgers, Episcopal Gay Bishops Decision Compounds Activists, PITTSBURGH POSTGAZETTE, Jul. 16, 2009, at A4; Laurie Goodstein, Conservative Methodists Propose Schisms Over Gay
Rights, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 2004, at A20; Associated Press, Episcopalians Meet to Discuss a Possible
Split, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2004, at 116; Don Lattin, California Episcopal Churches Split Over Gay
Marriage, S.F. GATE (Aug. 6, 2003), http://articles.sfgate.com/2003-08-06/news/17504436_1_gaybishop-episcopal-diocese-anglican-communion.
5. See Brian Schmalzbach, Note, Confusion and Coercion in Church Property Litigation, 96 VA. L.
REV. 443 (2010); Dan Dalton, Who Owns Church Property? (Apr. 8, 2009), available at
http://www.attorneysforlanduse.com/pdfs/who%20owns%20church%20property.pdf.
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from civil courts.6 In doing so, they place the judiciary in the center of a
doctrinal crossfire where courts are left to resolve the legal aspects of the
property dispute while avoiding the ecclesiastical questions that are
necessarily attached to the dispute.
A recent example of the current ecclesiastical crisis can be seen in the
Episcopal Church. In 2003, the highest governing body of the church
passed one resolution ordaining a noncelibate homosexual as a minister and
another resolution endorsing homosexual marriage.7 These actions resulted
in a nationwide schism within the church in which thousands of members
permanently departed from Episcopalian fellowship,8 and consequently,
disputes over church property erupted in numerous states, including
California, Connecticut, Georgia, and Virginia.9 With an increasing
percentage of the United States population shifting away from conservative
values and other mainstream denominations reconsidering their traditional
positions on issues such as homosexual marriage and ordainment of
homosexual ministers,10 it is likely that courts will be faced with an
increasing amount of church property litigation.11
Recently, Virginia took center stage in the Episcopal Church’s property
disputes.12 Several local parishes within the Commonwealth attempted to
separate themselves from the Episcopal Church while retaining possession
of their congregational property.13 The case formed the “perfect storm” of

6. Meghaan Cecilia McElroy, Note, Possession is Nine Tenths of the Law, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV.
311, 313 (2008).
7. Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of Va. v. Truro Church (Truro), 280 Va. 6, 15, 694 S.E.2d
555, 559 (2010).
8. Id.; see also Michelle Boorstein & Jacqueline L. Salmon, Diocese Sues 11 Seceding Congregations
Over Property Ownership, WASH. POST, Feb. 1, 2007, at B4.
9. See Christ Church in Savannah v. Bishop of Episcopal Diocese of Ga., Inc., 305 Ga. App. 87, 699
S.E.2d 45 (2010) (local parish sought to disaffiliate from national church, and national church brought
action to retain control of church property); Casa De Oracion, Church of God Prophecy v. Carrasco,
Nos. H034092, H034193, 2010 WL 1820438 (Cal. Ct. App. May 7, 2010) (San Jose church members
sought to remove the treasurer and trustee of the church and gain sole right to control and possess the
church's property); Episcopal Church in Diocese of Connecticut v. Gauss, 49 Conn. L. Rptr. 630, 2010
WL 1497141 (2010) (although parish property was held in trust for the diocese, parish members refused
to relinquish church property after defecting from the church); Truro, 280 Va. 6, 694 S.E.2d 555 (2010)
(Episcopalian congregation, formerly affiliated with first diocese, brought action to determine property
rights following alleged division of church).
10. See Lampman, supra note 1.
11. See George Conger, No break in pace of Episcopal Church lawsuits: The Church of England
Newspaper, August 6, 2010 p 6, GEOCONGER (Aug. 9, 2010),
http://geoconger.wordpress.com/2010/08/09/no-break-in-pace-of-episcopal-church-lawsuits-the-churchof-england-newspaper-august-6-2010-p-6; Lampman, supra note 1.
12. Mary Frances Schjonberg, Virginia: Court Ruling Clears Way for Property-Litigation, EPISCOPAL
NEWS SERV. (Dec. 19, 2008), http://www.episcopalchurch.org/81803_103915_ENG_HTM.htm.
13. Id.
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church property disputes because it involved a dated Virginia statute
purporting to resolve the issue, a unique set of facts underlying the case,
and national attention surrounding the litigation and the controversial issues
at play. Accordingly, the recent church property litigation in Virginia offers
the ideal case study to demonstrate why the issue of church property
disputes is more relevant now than ever before.
This article revisits the question of what a court may and may not do to
resolve these disputes without violating the Establishment or Free Exercise
Clauses of the First Amendment. Although the problem is one of national
scope, this article will primarily focus on the law within the Commonwealth
of Virginia and the recent legal developments to that law as a result of the
recent nationwide rupture in the Episcopal Church. Part I discusses
Supreme Court treatment of church property disputes and summarizes the
constitutional requirements applicable in these disputes. Part II explains the
impact of the ecclesiastical crisis on Virginia and recent developments to
Virginia law. Part III demonstrates how Virginia’s statutory framework
governing church property disputes places Virginia courts on the road for
an ecclesiastical collision. Part IV presents conclusions as to the future of
church property dispute law in Virginia and what changes the law will
undergo in the wake of an impending ecclesiastical collision.
I. DOCTRINAL FOUNDATIONS FOR RESOLVING ECCLESIASTICAL CRISES
This section will discuss prior Supreme Court of the United States
treatment of church property disputes related to constitutional law. The
constitutional scope of permissible state action in relation to the church
property developed over the course of several Supreme Court cases.
Accordingly, prior to discussing the historical development of First
Amendment jurisprudence surrounding the issue, it is essential to
understand the current status of the law.14 The clearest guiding principle in
this relatively undefined area of the law is that a court may not resolve a
religious property dispute on the basis of religious practice or doctrine.15
States have their choice of several options in attempting to approach these
disputes: (a) deferring to the resolution of the dispute as decided by the
religious organization’s adjudicatory body; (b) deciding the case on the
basis of a neutral principle of law; or (c) enacting legislation that

14. Presbyterian Church in the U.S. v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Mem’l Presbyterian Church
(Presbyterian Church), 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
15. Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 710 (1976); Md. & Va. Churches Eldership
of Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg Church (Churches of God), 396 U.S. 367, 368
(1970); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
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specifically directs the courts how to resolve church property disputes.16
The Supreme Court has held that one method is generally not preferred over
the other unless a court’s reliance on a particular neutral principle of law
would require it to resolve ecclesiastical questions. 17 In such a situation,
the First Amendment requires that “civil courts defer to the resolution of
issues of religious doctrine or polity by the highest court of a hierarchical
church organization.”18 The path taken by the Court in shaping these
constitutional doctrines governing state action in resolving church property
disputes is set forth below.
Originally, American courts relied on the English common law rule to
resolve church property disputes.19 That rule, known as “implied trust
theory,” provided that a hierarchical church maintains the right to control
the church property being utilized by local member churches.20
Specifically, courts implied a trust between a local church and its parent
organization in which the local church held the church property in trust for
the parent organization.21 Implied trust theory also provided protection for
local churches in the scenario where doctrinal shifts of the parent
organization resulted in members of a local church seeking to disaffiliate
from the parent organization while still maintaining possession of church
property. A local church facing such a situation could argue the “departure
from doctrine” element of implied trust theory.22 Essentially, the local
16. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 368 (Brennan, J. concurring).
17. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979).
18. Serb. Orthodox Diocese, 426 U.S. at 724–25.
19. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 445.
20. See Patty Gerstenblith, Civil Court Resolution of Property Disputes Among Religious
Organizations, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 513, 559 (1990) (“In place of a finding of actual intent to create a
trust in favor of the hierarchy, courts have relied primarily on the concept of implied consent to the
hierarchy's rules.”); Notes, Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, 75
HARV. L. REV. 1142, 1145–49 (1962) (discussing the English origins and early case law of the impliedtrust doctrine). Contra Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679 (1871) (rejecting the implied trust doctrine).
21. Watson, 80 U.S. at 727 (noting how previously English courts had been willing to decide which of
the contending parties adhered to the true standard of faith in the church organization); Judicial
Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1151 (“Many courts thus
declared that church property no matter how obtained was impressed with a trust for the maintenance of
the forms of ecclesiastical government to which the founders had adhered.”) (citing First Constitutional
Presbyterian Church v. Congregational Soc'y, 23 Iowa 567 (1867); Miller v. Gable, 2 Denio 492 (N.Y.
1845); Kniskern v. Lutheran Churches of St. John's & St. Peter's, 1 Sandf. Ch. 439 (N.Y. 1844); Roshi's
Appeal, 69 Pa. 462 (1871); Sutter v. Trustees of the First Reformed Dutch Church, 42 Pa. 503 (1862));
see also John E. Fennelly, Property Disputes and Religious Schisms: Who Is the Church?, 9 ST.
THOMAS L. REV. 319, 320 (1997) (noting that in cases involving hierarchical or congregational
churches, “a sound view rooted in our perception of church and state relations would require courts to
accept, as final and binding, those decisions pertaining to religious matters made by the church's highest
authority”).
22. See Craigdallie v. Aikman, 4 Eng. Rep. 435 (1820) (resolving a property dispute between factions
of a Scottish congregation by holding that unless otherwise agreed, the faction espousing the original
founding principles of the group is entitled to the property); H. Reese Hansen, Religious Organizations
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church would bring a judicial action alleging that the parent church
significantly deviated from the fundamental tenets of the particular faith, as
they were understood at the time the local church affiliated with it.23 The
court would then examine the doctrinal positions of the local church as
opposed to the parent organization, determine which position most closely
aligned with the traditional tenets of the faith, and terminate the implied
trust between the local church and parent church if the parent church had
substantially departed from doctrinal beliefs as they existed at the time that
the local parish affiliated with the parent organization.24 Accordingly, a
successful challenge in this manner enabled the local church to withdraw
from the parent church while retaining control of the property that it had
previously held in trust for the parent church. 25
The Supreme Court formed an alternative method of resolving church
property disputes in the 1871 case of Watson v. Jones.26 In Watson,
members of the Walnut Street Presbyterian Church were divided over
which members constituted the elders of the church,27 and they ultimately
formed two factions—each faction claiming it was lawfully entitled to
control the church property.28 The Supreme Court did not rely on implied
trust theory to resolve the dispute, but instead crafted a new rule known as
the “deference rule.”29 Under that rule, a court must defer to decisions of a
church’s internal governing structure “whenever the questions of discipline,
or of faith, or ecclesiastical rule, custom, or law have been decided by the
highest of these church judicatories to which the matter has been carried.”30
and the Law of Trusts, in RELIGIOUS ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 288 (James A. Serritella et
al. eds., 2006) (discussing Md. & Va. Eldership of the Churches of God v. Church of God at Sharpsburg,
Inc., 241 A.2d 691, 700–01 (Md. 1968), vacated and remanded, 393 U.S. 528 (1969), decree aff'd, 254
A.2d 162 (Md. 1969), appeal dismissed, 396 U.S. 367, 367–68 (1970) (per curiam)); Jeffrey B. Hassler,
Comment, A Multitude of Sins? Constitutional Standards for Legal Resolution of Church Property
Disputes in a Time of Escalating Intradenominational Strife, 35 PEPP. L. REV. 399, 408–10 (2008); see
also Fiona McCarthy, Church Property and Institutional Free Exercise: The Constitutionality of
Virginia Code Section 57-9, 95 VA. L. REV. 1841, 1863 (2009).
23. See Hansen, supra note 22, at 286.
24. Id.; Fennelly, supra note 21, at 320.
25. Fennelly, supra note 21, at 320.
26. 80 U.S. 679 (1871).
27. Id. at 717.
28. Id. at 717–18.
29. Id. at 727, 734–35.
30. Id. at 727. It is important to note, however, that the deference approach only applies to hierarchical
churches because congregational churches do not have a higher adjudicatory body to turn to for making
binding determinations as to the status of the property. See Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the
Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1157–58. A church is considered a hierarchical church if the
religious organization holding the property is a subordinate member of some general church
organization in which there are superior ecclesiastical tribunals with a general and ultimate power of
control more or less complete, in some supreme judicatory of discipline over the whole membership of
that general organization. Protestant Episcopal Church in Diocese of Va. v. Truro Church (Truro), 280

516

RICHMOND JOURNAL OF LAW AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST [Vol. XIV:401

Accordingly, following Watson, courts were left with two approaches to
managing church property disputes: (a) the implied trust theory and (b) the
deference approach.31
The Court made further developments to First Amendment jurisprudence
regarding church property disputes law in Presbyterian Church in the
United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church
(“Presbyterian Church”).32 The issue in Presbyterian Church involved the
constitutionality of the English common law approach to church property
disputes—implied trust theory.33 In that case, the Mary Elizabeth Blue Hull
Memorial Church (“Hull Church”) separated from its parent religious
organization, and a dispute arose between the two as to the ownership of the
Hull Church and its associated property.34 Applying the implied trust
theory and the “departure from doctrine” test, the Supreme Court of
Georgia awarded the property to the local congregation.35 However, the
Supreme Court of the United States struck down implied trust theory as
unconstitutional.36 Specifically, it explained that the “departure from
Va. 6, 13, 694 S.E.2d 555, 558 (2010) (citing Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 698, 152 S.E.2d 23, 26
(1967) (explaining that Virginia Code section 57-9 applies to congregations of hierarchical churches)).
The Watson case was not decided on constitutional grounds. See Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over
the Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1156 (“To be sure, Watson is not a constitutional decision.
The [F]ourteenth [A]mendment was only a few years old, and it would be many more years before
guarantees in the [F]irst [A]mendment would be deemed operative against state action by virtue of the
due process clause.”). However, the deference rule articulated in Watson was revisited in Kedroff v. St.
Nichols Cathedral. 344 U.S. 94 (1952). This case involved two different archbishops that claimed a
right to use the church property at issue. Id. at 96. The Court declared the New York statute
unconstitutional because it violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 120–21. It applied the
deference rule articulated in Watson and explained that deferring to a church’s internal ruling
“necessarily follows in order that there may be free exercise of religion” under the Constitution. Id. at
121.
31. 80 U.S. at 725 (noting that the Supreme Court decided to follow the deference approach without
absolutely rejecting the English theory of implied trust); Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use
of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1157–58 (“[W]hile most state courts professed adherence to
Watson, and while judicial interference with hierarchically organized churches decreased markedly after
Watson, the implied-trust doctrine persisted in most states principally in connection with
congregationally governed churches.” Id.
32. 393 U.S. 440 (1969). But see Draskovich v. Pasalich, 280 N.E.2d 69, 78 (1972) (leaving open the
possibility that the implied trust theory could be applied on some other basis). The case involved two
local Presbyterian churches that voted to withdraw from the parent church and become an autonomous
Presbyterian body. Id. at 71. The local churches maintained that the various theological, political, and
administrative actions and declarations by the parent church constituted a departure from the
fundamental tenets of faith, a violation of the church constitution. Subsequently, the parent church
attempted to regain control over the property being used by the local churches. Id. at 81. Rather than
make use of the internal appellate procedures with the church governance system, the churches filed suit
seeking to enjoin the parent church from trespassing on the properties. Id. at 71, 81. The local churches
prevailed at the lower level based on the implied trust theory. Id. at 72.
33. 393 U.S. at 443–44.
34. Id. at. 442–43.
35. Id. at 443–44.
36. Id. at 449–51.
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doctrine” element of implied trust theory violated the First Amendment
mandate that civil courts refrain from making any decision regarding the
ownership status of church property rights when that decision involved
interpretation of church doctrine.37 It further added that the internal
governing authorities of a religious entity are the appropriate arbitrators in
matters of “ecclesiastical cognizance,” and civil courts cannot be called up
to resolve a dispute when the very nature of the dispute implicates
ecclesiastical questions.38 To rely on the courts to resolve such questions
would run directly afoul of the Establishment Clause.39
Although the Court seized the opportunity in Presbyterian Church to
eliminate one possible approach for resolving church property disputes, it
also crafted a second alternative for courts to handle such litigation. Indeed,
states needed another option because the only remaining approach after the
abolishment of implied trust theory—the deference approach—could only
be applied if the parties belonged to a religious organization that maintained
an adjudicatory body to resolve property disputes between its members.
Accordingly, if the parties of a church property dispute were members of a
church that did not have such an adjudicatory body, a court would be left
without an established legal principle to decide the dispute. The Court,
presumably sensitive to this dilemma, preempted the problem by explaining
that its holding was not to be construed as requiring courts to close their

37. Id.
38. Id. at 446–47. The Court reaffirmed this position in Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich. 426
U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976). In that case, Milivojevich acted as the bishop over the general church, and the
trial court concluded that the members of the church incorrectly removed him from office and appointed
a different bishop to replace him. Id. at 697–98. In justifying its holding, the Court mentioned a
previous Supreme Court decision that indicated that a civil court may not have to show deference to the
decisions of religious governing bodies if the decision was made in a fraudulent, collusive, or arbitrary
manner. Id. at 712. On review, the Supreme Court rejected that arbitrariness was a valid exception to
the deference doctrine. Id. at 712, 734. The majority went on to explain that application of an
arbitrariness exception impermissibly required judicial “inquiry into the procedures that canon or
ecclesiastical law supposedly require the church judicatory to follow or else into the substantive criteria
by which they supposedly [are] to decide the ecclesiastical question.” Id. at 713. To do so “would
undermine the general rule that religious controversies are not the proper subject of civil court inquiry,
and that a civil court must accept the ecclesiastical decisions of church tribunals as it finds them.” Id.
39. 393 U.S. at 451–52. The church property dispute cases decided by the Supreme Court at the time of
the neutral principles doctrine serve as a precursor to the probation on excessive government
entanglement with religion. At the risk of dramatically understating the current state of First
Amendment jurisprudence, one approach to testing whether a government action violates the
Establishment Clause is the three-part analysis articulated by the Court in Lemon v. Kurtzman. 403 U.S.
602 (1971). Under the Lemon test, government action violates the Establishment Clause, unless: (a)
there is a legitimate secular purpose for taking the action, (b) the primary effect of the action is to neither
inhibit nor advance religion, and (c) the action does not foster excessive entanglement between
government and religion. Id. at 615. Although a court would likely couch a decision regarding a church
property dispute in terms of the “neutral principles” doctrine, the doctrine appears to be very similar to
the concept of excessive entanglement.
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doors to religious bodies seeking adjudication of property disputes.40
Rather courts could decide such disputes on the basis of neutral principles
of law—principles applicable in any property dispute—without judicially
establishing churches in violation of the First Amendment.41
The Court made clear in Presbyterian Church that states could resolve
church property disputes by either deferring to the internal adjudicatory
bodies of the church or by applying neutral principles of law; however, it
left unanswered the question of whether one approach should be applied to
a dispute before considering the other.42 In other words, in a situation
where a church property dispute arose and the church’s judicatory rendered
a decision purporting to resolve the dispute, were the courts required to
defer to that decision where neutral principles of law commanded a contrary
outcome?43
The Court clarified the answer to this question in Jones v. Wolf,44 where
the majority faction of a divided, local church sought to disaffiliate the
church from its parent denomination.45 The denomination’s judicatory
made a formal decision that the minority faction of the church—the faction
that sought to remain aligned with the denomination—was the rightful
owner of the property.46 The minority faction argued that the trial court was
required to defer to the decision of the denomination’s judicatory.47
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States rejected this
argument, explaining that “a State is constitutionally entitled to adopt
neutral principles of law as a means of adjudicating church property
disputes” and is not required to apply the deference approach in lieu of
neutral principles when confronted with a decision between the two.48 The
Court then, however, added a caveat to this rule.49 A court may only choose

40. 403 U.S. at 625; see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979) (noting that there can be no
question that the constitutionally protected religious autonomy concerning “matters of church
government” encompass a church’s freedom to adopt and demand civil court enforcement of its own
rules of property ownership).
41. 393 U.S. at 449, 451–52.
42. Id. at 449; Kenneth E. North, Church Property Disputes: A Constitutional Perspective (2000),
reprinted in A GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW: THEOLOGICAL, CONSTITUTIONAL AND PRACTICAL
CONSIDERATIONS app. C, at 209 (Lloyd J. Lunceford ed., 2006) (discussing the issue in Jones v. Wolf of
whether a court may forgo the deference test and apply neutral principles of state law).
43. See North, supra note 42, at 209.
44. 443 U.S. 595 (1979).
45. Id. The majority faction brought suit, and the trial court found for the majority faction on the basis
of neutral principles of law. Id. at 599.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 604.
49. Id.
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to resolve a dispute applying neutral principles of law if applying those
principles would not require the court to decide ecclesiastical questions.50
If a court must resolve ecclesiastical questions to apply the neutral
principles doctrine, it must “defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by
the authoritative ecclesiastical body.”51
A third constitutional alternative for government resolution of church
property disputes likely exists in the form of courts applying legislation that
specifically governs such disputes.52 In other words, state legislatures may
enact statutes that guide the outcome of a religious property dispute so long
as the statute operates in a manner that avoids state involvement in religious
doctrine.53 The precedential basis for this third option is found in Justice
Brennan’s concurring opinion in Churches of God.54 While it does not
appear that the Court has expressly endorsed special statutes as a third
alternative approach, the Churches of God Court seemingly adopted the
reasoning from Justice Brennan’s concurrence in Jones by quoting it in its
ruling.55 Specifically, the Court’s holding relied on Justice Brennan’s
argument that “a State may adopt any one of various approaches for settling
church property disputes,” but stopped short of quoting his language that
categorized special statutes as their own separate approach to resolving
church property disputes.56 This omission notwithstanding, the context of
Justice Brennan’s concurrence in referencing “various approaches”
included states adopting special statutes.57 Thus, the Court’s use of Justice
Brennan’s concurrence in Jones seemingly lends support to the conclusion
50. Id.
51. Id. (noting that if the interpretation of the instruments of ownership would require the civil court to
resolve a religious controversy, then the court must “defer to the resolution of the doctrinal issue by the
authoritative ecclesiastical body” (citing Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 709
(1976))); see also Scotts African Union Methodist Protestant Church v. Conference of African Union
First Colored Methodist Protestant Church, 98 F.3d 78, 88 (3rd Cir. 1996) (discussing Churches of God,
396 U.S. 367, 368 (1970), indicating there are only two approaches to resolving church property
disputes).
52. Some commentators argue that the deference approach and the neutral principles doctrine are the
only two methods available to civil courts to resolve church property disputes. See Justin M. Gardner,
Note, Ecclesiastical Divorce in Hierarchical Denominations and the Resulting Custody Battle Over
Church Property: How the Supreme Court Has Needlessly Rendered Church Property Trust Ineffectual,
6 AVE MARIA L. REV. 235, 245 (2007) (stating that “as the matter currently stands, the civil courts have
two permissible methods of adjudicating church property disputes”—neutral principles of law and the
deference approach).
53. Churches of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring); see also In re Episcopal
Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 492, 198 P.3d 66, 83 (2009) (approving of the statute because it leaves
control of ecclesiastical policy and doctrine to the church).
54. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
55. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (quoting Churches of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970)
(Brennan, J., concurring)).
56. Id.
57. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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that the Court recognizes the constitutional validity of statutes designed
specifically to resolve church property disputes. However, it remains
unsettled whether the Court considers these “special statutes” to be their
own separate category of resolving church property disputes or merely a
subcategory of the broader doctrine of “neutral principles of law.”58
One possible reading of the Court’s use of Justice Brennan’s Jones
concurrence is that, in referencing his discussion of the various approaches
available to the states for resolving church property disputes, it adopted his
categorization of those approaches. According to Justice Brennan, special
statutes were an entirely separate approach to resolving church property
disputes than “neutral principles of law.”59 This categorization makes sense
given that neutral principles of law are supposed to be principles applicable
in any property dispute and a statute specifically targeting religious
institutions would not be applicable in disputes not involving such
institutions. Courts, however, have read Jones as considering special
statutes merely one type of neutral principle of law that a state may rely on
in resolving church property disputes. As one court explained:
A statute governing specifically church property obviously is not developed for
use in all property disputes, but, as the high court has made clear, it may still be
considered in applying neutral principles of law as that court defines the term.
Such a statute is-or must be-neutral in the sense that it does not require state
60
courts to resolve questions of religious doctrine.

Indeed, when resolving church property disputes, it remains unsettled
how courts should reconcile Justice Brennan’s categorization of special
statutes as a wholly separate approach from neutral principles of law with
the Jones analysis, which indicates that a special statute is a neutral
principle of law. The Supreme Court of Colorado commented on this issue,
noting:
Justice Brennan identified a third approach-the passage of special statutes
governing church property arrangements in a manner that precludes state
interference in doctrine. Since the neutral principles approach involves, among
other things, an analysis of relevant state statutes, it is not clear how this third
61
alternative differs from a neutral principles analysis.

58. Compare In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 481 n.4, 198 P.3d 66, 76 n.4 (2009), with
Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.6 (Colo. 1986).
59. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J. concurring) (“Neutral principles of law, developed
for use in all property disputes, provide another means for resolving litigation over religious property”
and another “approach is the passage of special statutes governing church property arrangements in a
manner that precludes state interference in doctrine.”) (citations omitted).
60. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th at 481 n.4, 198 P.3d at 76 n.4.
61. Bishop & Diocese of Colo., 716 P.2d at 91 n.6.
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Ultimately, although the question whether special statutes are an entirely
separate approach from neutral principles of law remains unclear, it is clear
that “such statutes must be carefully drawn to leave control of ecclesiastical
polity, as well as doctrine, to church governing bodies.”62
In summary, there are two definite approaches courts may pursue to
resolve church property disputes that do not offend the First Amendment:
(1) a court may resolve church property disputes by deferring to the highest
deciding body in a church’s internal governance so long as doing so does
not require the court to resolve ecclesiastical questions; or (2) a court may
resolve church property disputes by applying neutral principles of law—
those principles of law that are applicable in any property dispute and do
not require the court to resolve any ecclesiastical issues underlying the
property dispute. There is some confusion as to whether there is a third
approach available in the form of special statutes allowing courts to resolve
church property disputes without deciding ecclesiastical questions or
whether such statutes are merely a subcategory of neutral principles of
law.63 Although states are not under a general obligation to apply any
particular approach of these three options in favor of another,64 the
deference approach must be applied where relying on neutral principles of
law would require the court to resolve ecclesiastical questions.65
Furthermore, if special statutes are categorically different from neutral
principles of law, such statutes manifest state legislatures’ intent to resolve
church property disputes in a particular way and, accordingly, courts should
attempt to apply such statutes before considering either the neutral
principles approach or the deference approach.66 As will be shown in the
next section, however, determining when such statutes are applicable is—
and will continue to be—the subject of significant litigation.
II. RECENT ECCLESIASTICAL CRISIS IN VIRGINIA
The ecclesiastical crisis recently found its way into the Virginia courts.
In many ways, Virginia acted as the perfect storm for the ecclesiastical
crisis to occur. The Code of Virginia contains a statute dating back to the

62. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring); see, e.g., Goodson v. Northside Bible
Church, 261 F. Supp. 99 (S.D. Ala. 1966), aff’d, 387 F.2d 534 (5th Cir. 1967).
63. Compare In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th at 481 n.4, 198 P.3d at 76 n.4, with Bishop &
Diocese of Colo., 716 P.2d at 91 n.6.
64. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602 (1979) (quoting Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 368); see also
In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th at 478, 198 P.3d at 74) (noting that the First Amendment does
not dictate that a state must follow a particular method of resolving church property disputes).
65. Jones, 443 U.S. at 604.
66. See Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1177–80.
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Civil War that purports to resolve church property disputes.67 Additionally,
when the Episcopal Church experienced a major division in 2003, several
congregations that left the church were located in Virginia.68 Accordingly,
the Virginia congregations’ battle to retain their church property gained
nationwide attention as similarly situated dissident congregations in other
states waited, hoping that the Virginia dispute could lend support to their
efforts.69 This section identifies the relevant background of various factors
contributing to Virginia’s recent ecclesiastical crisis. Part II.A discusses the
Virginia statute that governs church property disputes and the history of that
statute. Part II.B explains the events giving rise to the recent schism within
the Episcopal Church. Part II.C analyzes the events that unfolded as
dissident congregations in Virginia attempted to retain control of church
property following their separation from the Episcopal Church. Part II.D
summarizes the ruling of the Supreme Court of Virginia on the dispute and
its reasoning in reaching that ruling.
A. Virginia’s Statutory Framework for Church Property Disputes
As between the deference approach, the neutral principles of law
approach, and the special statutes approach, the Virginia General Assembly
elected to resolve church property disputes through the use of a special
statute.70 Indeed, Virginia adopted its church property dispute statute,
Virginia Code section 57-9 (“Section 57-9”), before the United States
Supreme Court made several significant decisions delineating constitutional
principles applying to government resolution of church property disputes.71
Section 57-9(A) is a Civil War-era statute meant to determine various
parties’ property rights in church property when a congregational “division”
occurs within a hierarchical “church” or a “religious society.”72 It provides,
in relevant part, that:
If a division has heretofore occurred or shall hereafter occur in a church or
religious society, to which any such congregation whose property is held by
trustees is attached, the members of such congregation over 18 years of age
may, by a vote of a majority of the whole number, determine to which branch
73
of the church or society such congregation shall thereafter belong.

67. See VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
68. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 15, 694 S.E.2d 555, 559 (2010); Schjonberg, supra note 12.
69. Truro, 280 Va. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at 559.
70. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
71. Virginia Religious Freedom Act, ch. 210, 1867 Va. Acts 649–50 (current version at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 57-9 (Repl. 2007)).
72. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A).
73. See id.
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The statute purports to provide courts with a neutral method for resolving
property disputes that surround a specific church’s property when a
congregation of that church divides and a majority of the congregation
votes to belong to a branch of the church to which it was formerly
attached.74 However, deciding when a “division” has occurred, or whether
a church is a branch of a particular hierarchy, carries its own inherent
difficulties.75 Namely, the resolution of these issues can easily become
ecclesiastical quicksand, dragging the courts into the impermissible realm
of deciding matters within the province of religious governance.76
Section 57-9(A)’s roots reach back to the Reconstruction era. The
Virginia General Assembly enacted the Virginia Religious Freedom Act
(“VRFA”)—the predecessor to Section 57-9(A)—in 1867.77 The General
Assembly enacted the VRFA against the backdrop of several major church
divisions that had already occurred as a result of diverging perspectives on
the issues of slavery and federalism.78 John Baldwin—at this point in time

74. Id.
75. See Kent Greenawalt, Hands Off! Civil Court Involvement in Conflicts Over Religious Property, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 1843, 1863 (1998) (“A look at appellate decisions, which develop alternatives among
the options the Supreme Court has left open, reveals that the law is less straightforward than one might
suppose from reading the Court's jurisprudence.”); Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 443. Compare
Hoskinson v. Pusey, 73 Va. (32 Gratt) 428, 439 (1879) (implicitly recognizing that the division statute
does not require that a division be authorized or approved by a denomination), with Reid v. Gholson,
229 Va. 179, 192, 327 S.E.2d 107, 115 (1985) (defining “division” as “to separate from the body of [the]
church . . . to rend it into groups, each of which seeks to take over all the property and characterize the
other as apostate, excommunicated, and outcast . . . such a division [must be created] as a prerequisite to
relief under [Section] 57-9”).
76. Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va. 604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2001); see
also Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 221–22 (1963); Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440,
449 (1969) (noting that the First Amendment “commands civil courts to decide church property disputes
without resolving underlying controversies over religious doctrine. Hence, States, religious
organizations, and individuals must structure relationships involving church property so as not to require
the civil courts to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”).
77. See Virginia Religious Freedom Act, ch. 210, 1867 Va. Acts 649–50 (current version at VA. CODE
ANN. § 57-9 (Repl. 2007)); see also Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. 103, 108, 12 S.E. 228, 230 (1890).
78. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1848. One such division involved the Methodist Episcopal Church
(“MEC”) in 1844. See Humphrey v. Burnside, 67 Ky. 215, 225–26 (1868) (noting that the separation
within MEC was one of the most prominent divisions at the time and “was an event that . . . formed a
part of, the history of the country, of which no well-informed man could be ignorant”). Pursuant to a
“plan of separation” adopted by the MEC General Convention, MEC formally divided into a northern
and southern branch. See Smith v. Swormstedt, 57 U.S. 288, 298-99, 301 (1853). The MEC General
Convention’s resolution allowed for congregations that resided in the area constituting the border
between the northern and southern branch to align itself with either branch. See Brooke v. Shacklett, 54
Va. (13 Gratt) 301, 326 (1856). To do so, the individual church needed to present the matter to its
congregation to be decided by majority vote; several years after the division occurred, contention arose
as to whether the MEC or the MEC South was the appropriate beneficiary of a particular trust. Id. at
323–24, 327. The parties to the dispute were opposing factions at two churches in Fauquier County,
with one faction being supported by the northern branch and one faction being supported by the southern
branch. Id. The Supreme Court of Virginia held that, pursuant to the separation plan, the MEC
experienced a division subsequent to the effective date of the deed in question, but prior to the date on
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the Speaker of the House of Delegates—sponsored the VRFA.79 The
General Assembly’s intent behind enacting the statute was to provide the
courts with a method of managing church property disputes in light of the
doctrinal instability of churches during that period in history.80 As
originally enacted, the statute provided:
[W]hereas divisions have occurred in some churches or religious societies to
which such religious congregations have been attached, and such divisions may
hereafter occur, it shall in any such case be lawful for the communicants... by a
vote of a majority of the whole number... to determine to which branch of the
81
church or society such congregation shall thereafter belong.

The statute, as originally enacted and currently, affords congregations
executing voting procedures in accordance with the provision significant
protection against having to surrender their property to the parent church
because a judicial determination of property rights under Section 57-9(A) is
“conclusive as to the title to and control of any property held in trust for
such congregation.”82 Although Section 57-9 provides the basis of
considerable church property litigation,83 it is not the only statute in the
Virginia code affecting the ability of religious institutions to own property.
Rather, it is one of several statutes in the Virginia Code that address the
disposition of property held by religious organizations.84 This Article,
which the case reached the court. Id. at 327. Presuming that the separation plan had been properly
adopted by the MEC General Convention—making it valid—the provision of that plan which allowed
border societies to vote “to choose to which jurisdictional division of the church they w[ould] belong
[either to the MEC or MEC South],” was derivatively valid. Id. at 326. Noting that the church at issue
fell within the border region and, by majority vote, adhered to the MEC South, the Supreme Court of
Virginia held that the deed operated to convey the property to the members of the southern branch. Id.
at 327–28.
79. In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal I, 76 Va. Cir. 786, 843 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008); see also HAMILTON JAMES
ECKENRODE, THE POLITICAL HISTORY OF VIRGINIA DURING RECONSTRUCTION 41 (J.M. Vincent et al.,
eds. 1904).
80. In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal I, 76 Va. Cir. at 855.
81. Virginia Religious Freedom Act, ch. 210, 1867 Va. Acts 649–50 (current version at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 57-9 (Repl. 2007)).
82. Id. The first Supreme Court of Virginia case to discuss the predecessor statute to Section 57-9 is
Hoskinson v. Pusey. 73 Va. (32 Gratt) 428 (1879). Once again, members of the MEC and the MEC
South were disputing property rights as to church property purporting to be located within the border
area of the 1844 division. Id. at 431. Specifically, the property at issue involved a “house of public
worship” known as “Harmony Church” and a parsonage. Id. at 431, 434. In that case, the deed
addressing the disposition of the properties contained the same substantive language as the deed at issue
in the Brooke case. Id. However, the alignment of the members of the church remained unclear because
of inconsistent and conflicting voting occurring at local conferences. Id. at 440. Although
understanding the intricacies of the case’s factual background are not necessary for the purposes of this
article, it is worth noting that Hoskinson could arguably be read as holding that a “division” under
Section 57-9 need not occur in accordance with the hierarchical church’s policy to qualify as a
“division” within the meaning of the statute.
83. See Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 152 S.E.2d 23 (1967); Finley v. Brent, 87 Va. 103, 12 S.E. 228
(1890); Hoskinson, 73 Va. (32 Gratt) 428 (1879); Brooke v. Shacklett, 54 Va. (13 Gratt) 301 (1856).
84. In distinguishing the statutory framework governing property held for religious purposes, McCarthy
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however, will primarily focus on the Supreme Court of Virginia’s treatment
of Section 57-9(A) in light of the recent rupture in the Episcopal Church.
B. Rupture in the Episcopal Church Reaches Virginia
The Episcopal Church (“TEC”) formally organized in 1789 as the
successor to the Church of England in colonial America.85 TEC is
primarily located in the United States but also maintains a presence outside
the country.86 It is the principal national church following the Anglican
tradition in the United States.87 As an Anglican church, there is worldwide
affiliation between TEC and other Anglican churches by way of the
Anglican Communion.88 The Anglican Communion, however, is not vested
with formal decision-making authority over any of its members.89 Rather,
“[t]he churches of the Anglican Communion are held together by bonds of
affection and common loyalty, expressed through links with the
‘Instruments of Communion.’”90 These “instruments of communion” are
the Archbishop of Canterbury, the Lambeth Conference, the Primates

stated:
Section 57-9 is connected to a larger statutory scheme in Virginia that governs property
held for religious purposes. Overall, the code emphasizes a distinction between
congregational and hierarchical churches. It also requires that a trust for an indefinite
beneficiary (such as an individual or unincorporated body) be expressly validated by
statute. Section 57-7.1 validates transfers of religious property that are “made to or for the
benefit of any church, church diocese, religious congregation or religious society.” There
are two sections of the code that provide alternative methods for holding religious
property. Section 57-16(A), enacted in 1942, permits church property to be held in the
name of an ecclesiastical officer. Section 57-16.1, enacted in 2005, permits an
unincorporated church or religious body to create a corporation to hold, administer, and
manage its real and personal property. Thus, if a hierarchical body wants to avoid having
the congregational form of governance imposed on it by Section 57-9(A), the alternative
options of incorporating or titling the property in the name of an ecclesiastical officer are
found in the other statutes. Finally, Section 57-15 addresses alterations made to church
property outside of the context of a church division.
McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1849–50 (citations omitted).
85. McElroy, supra note 6, at 332.
86. See The Episcopal Church, Partnerships, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/110056_ENG_HTM.htm
(last visited Dec. 10, 2010) (detailing the church’s presence and partnerships with countries in Africa,
Asia-Pacific, Latin American, the Caribbean and the Middle East).
87. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 14, 694 S.E.2d 555, 559 (2010).
88. The Episcopal Church, Partnerships, http://www.episcopalchurch.org/110056_ENG_HTM.htm (last
visited Dec. 10, 2010).
89. “The Anglican Communion is an international body that consists of 38 ‘provinces,’ which are
‘regional and national churches that share a common history of their understanding of the Church
catholic through the See of Canterbury’ in England.” Truro, 280 Va. at 14, 694 S.E.2d at 558 (internal
citation omitted).
90. McElroy, supra note 6, at 332–33.
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Meeting, and the Anglican Consultative Council.91 TEC maintains a
national leadership structure and a regional leadership structure level.92 At
the national level, TEC leadership promulgates canons and constitutional
provisions that are binding on the local congregations.93 At the regional
level, the governing authority is the diocese for a particular region.94 A
bishop is charged with governing the diocese and all decisions by the
diocese are binding on the parishes that fall within its borders.95
Every three years, the highest governing body within TEC—the General
Convention—meets to discuss and form resolutions in matters of church
Resolutions adopted by the General
governance and doctrine. 96
Convention are binding on TEC and the dioceses.97 In 2003, the General
Convention met to address several controversial issues giving rise to
internal disputes within the denomination.98 Specifically, the debate
focused on the acceptability of allowing non-celibate homosexuals to serve
as Episcopal bishops and whether TEC would offer its blessing and
endorsement as to same-sex marriages.99 As a result of its deliberations, the
General Convention took several actions, including: (a) confirming the
election of Gene Robinson, a non-celibate homosexual priest, as Bishop of
the Diocese of New Hampshire of TEC; (b) adopting resolution allowing
91. Id. The actions proposed at these various gatherings are not binding on any members of the
Anglican Communion, but are “primarily consultative” in nature. Truro, 280 Va. at 14, 694 S.E.2d at
559. Thus, any resolution proposed by the Anglican Communion only becomes binding upon a
particular church if that church ratifies the resolution through its own internal governing structure. Id.
92. McElroy, supra note 6, at 333. But see Philip Turner, Communion and Episcopal Authority,
http://www.anglicancommunioninstitute.com/2009/07/communion-and-episcopal-authority/ (Jul. 9,
2009) (“Within [t]he Episcopal Church there is no constitutional provision for a hierarchical structure
that places the authority of individual Bishops in their Dioceses within a larger structure to which they
must defer.”). Dr. Turner argues that the Episcopal Church is, in fact, not a hierarchical church but “an
association of [d]ioceses that lacks an ordered hierarchy save within the various Dioceses that comprise
its membership.” Id. However, the Supreme Court of Virginia made its ruling on the assumption that
TEC is a hierarchical church, not an association of dioceses. Truro, 280 Va. at 7, 694 S.E.2d at 557.
Thus, this article will proceed under the same assumption.
93. McElroy, supra note 6, at 332–33.
94. Id.
95. Id.
96. Truro, 280 Va. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at 559. According to the Executive Offices of the General
Convention:
The General Convention is the governing body of The Episcopal Church (TEC) that
meets every three years. The Convention is a bicameral legislature that includes the
House of Deputies and the House of Bishops. The work at Convention is carried out by
deputies and bishops representing each diocese. During its triennial meeting deputies and
bishops consider a wide range of important matters facing the Church.
Executive Offices of the General Convention, Office of the General Convention,
http://generalconvention.org/ (last visited Dec. 10, 2010).
97. Truro, 280 Va. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at 559.
98. Id.
99. Id.
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churches to offer their blessings and endorsements in regards to same-sex
unions; and (c) rejecting a resolution seeking to preserve TEC’s position on
issues of sexuality in a manner consistent with the traditional Christian
faith.100 These actions were ill-received by many members of TEC
nationwide.101 Indeed, they gave rise to considerable division among
congregation members practicing their faith in the Protestant Episcopal
Church in the Diocese of Virginia (“the Diocese”) because the diocesan
leadership supported Robinson’s confirmation.102
Outraged by the
resolutions adopted by the 2003 General Convention’s and the Diocese’s
support of Robinson’s confirmation, congregants from various churches
proceeded to send hundreds of letters of dissent to the Diocese and withhold
the payment of pledges previously committed to the Diocese and TEC.103
Internal segregation ensued within the TEC on a national level
throughout 2004 and 2005, and the Diocese attempted to manage its own
internal division by forming a “Reconciliation Commission.”104 The
Reconciliation Commission sought to address the congregation’s concerns
regarding the controversial resolutions of the General Convention.105 When
these efforts proved fruitless, the Reconciliation Commission promulgated
voting procedures that allowed the congregations to separate from the
Diocese.106 Several congregations performed the necessary votes to initiate
the separation procedures.107 Their attempts to separate ultimately failed,
however.108 Diocesan leadership informed the congregations that TEC
changed its position on congregational separation and any separation
purportedly achieved through the Reconciliation Commission’s procedures
would not be binding on TEC or the Diocese.109 Despite this change in
position, fifteen congregations voted to separate from the Diocese between
2006 and 2007.110
After separating from the Diocese, the dissident congregations sought to
align themselves with another church affiliated with the Anglican

100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at559.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. at 15–16, 694 S.E.2d at 559–60.
107. Id. at 16, 694 S.E.2d at 560.
108. Id.
109. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 16, 694 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2010).
110. Id. Indeed, congregational uproar within TEC was not limited to the Diocese of Virginia. Id.
Congregations belonging to other dioceses also voiced their discontent with the 2003 General
Convention and, ultimately, separated from their respective dioceses. Id.
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Communion.111 Ultimately, they voted to attach to a stateside province of
the Church of Nigeria.112 Originally, the Church of Nigeria’s ministry
consisted of governing the Anglican churches in the Federal Republic of
Nigeria.113 It established a mission in the United States, which was
identified as the “Convocation of Anglican Nigerians in America.”114 This
mission provided oversight to expatriate Nigerian congregations in the
continental United States.115 In 2006, the Church of Nigeria reorganized
and expanded the mission.116 Amongst other changes, the mission was
renamed as the Convocation of Anglicans in North America (“CANA”).117
CANA established a presence in Virginia by forming a district within the
Commonwealth that it labeled the Anglican District of Virginia
(“ADV”).118 Presumably, CANA’s efforts to reorganize its operations and
establish a formal presence in Virginia stemmed from its desire to welcome
the recently disaffiliated Virginia congregations into ADV.119 The
realignment of the congregations with CANA, however, did anything but
bring an end to the dissident congregations interactions with TEC. Indeed,
the congregations and TEC were destined to clash again. This struggle,
however, would not be over matters of church doctrine. Rather, the stage
was set for the parties to begin their battle over who was entitled to possess
and make use of the congregation’s property occupied when congregations
separated from TEC.
C. The Battle for Church Property
Following their attachment to ADV, the dissident congregations sought
to establish what property interests, if any, they maintained in their
respective locations.120 In 2006 and 2007, nine congregations within ADV
(“CANA Congregations”) filed petitions pursuant to Section 57-9(A) within
their respective circuit courts seeking a judicial determination that a
division occurred within TEC and the congregations had voted to align with

111. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 16, 694 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2010).
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. This conclusion is supported by the fact that, by 2007, 10,000 of CANA’s 12,000 members were
former members of Episcopalian congregations. Id. at 17, 694 S.E.2d at 560.
120. Id.
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a different branch of the TEC.121 Per the language of the statute, if a
congregation made such a determination, and the court approved that
determination, the court should enter an order reflecting that determination,
and that order would be “conclusive as to title and control.”122 In support of
their petitions, the CANA Congregations argued that: (a) the separations, as
they occurred throughout 2004 to 2007, constituted a division within TEC,
as contemplated by Section 57-9; (b) subsequent to the division, the
congregations voted to affiliate with ADV, a qualifying “branch” of the
Anglican Communion; and (c) as a result, ownership of the properties
passed to the respective congregations located thereon by operation of
Section 57-9.123
Not surprisingly, the Diocese and TEC opposed the grant of the petitions
and filed complaints against each of the CANA Congregations alleging
trespass and conversion.124 Additionally, the Diocese and TEC filed
declaratory judgment actions that sought “a determination of trust,
proprietary, and contract rights, if any, that the Diocese and [TEC] had in
the properties used by the CANA Congregations which were the subject of
[Section] 57-9(A) petitions.”125 The Diocese and TEC challenged CANA
Congregations’ petitions on the basis of several arguments, including: (a)
the congregations’ separation from the TEC and the Diocese did not qualify
as a “division” within TEC or the Diocese, as contemplated by Section 579; and (b) even assuming the CANA Congregations’ separations did qualify
as a division with TEC or the Diocese, the CANA Congregations failed to
satisfy the statute’s “branch” requirement because CANA or the ADV did
not operate as a branch of TEC or the Diocese.126
The Supreme Court of Virginia, relying on the Multiple Claimant
Litigation Act,127 appointed a three-judge panel to manage the dispute.128
The panel consolidated the various actions brought by each of the CANA
Congregations and established venue for the matter in Fairfax County.129
The trial court first held a hearing to determine the applicability of Section
57-9.130 The CANA Congregations, Diocese, and TEC presented expert
121. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
122. Id.
123. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 17, 694 S.E.2d 555, 560 (2010).
124. Id. at 17, 694 S.E.2d at 560–61; In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal Church Property Litigation, 76 Va.
Cir. 786, 788 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2008).
125. Truro, 280 Va. at 17, 694 S.E.2d at 560–61.
126. Id. at 18, 694 S.E.2d at 561.
127. See generally VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-267.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
128. Truro, 280 Va. at 17–18, 694 S.E.2d at 561.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 18, 694 S.E.2d at 561.
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testimony and argument as to whether the statute controlled in the case.131
The evidence of all parties primarily focused on constructing the definitions
of the terms “division” and “branch” in accordance with how those terms
would have been used in the context of the various nineteenth century
church divisions that gave rise to the enactment of the predecessor statute of
Section 57-9.132 Following the hearing, the court issued an opinion in
which it held that “the Diocese, TEC, and the Anglican Communion were
all ‘church[es] or religious societ[ies],’ and that CANA, the ADV, the
Church of Nigeria, [TEC], and the Diocese were all ‘branches’ of the
Anglican Communion for purposes of applying [Section] 57-9(A).”133
Furthermore, the court found that CANA and ADV were “branches” of
TEC and the Diocese.134 Thus, according to the circuit court, the CANA
Congregations Section 57-9(A) petitions were properly before it and the
congregations were entitled to have the court determine what property
interests, if any, they were granted by the statute.135
Following the circuit court’s ruling that Section 57-9(A) provided the
controlling authority in the case, TEC and the Diocese challenged the
statute’s constitutionality on several grounds—namely, that Section 57-9
violated the United States Constitution’s and Virginia Constitution’s free
exercise clauses, principles of due process, and the contracts clause.136
After holding several hearings on the matter, the circuit court issued an
opinion letter upholding the constitutionality of Section 57-9.137 Shortly
thereafter, the court granted the CANA Congregations’ Section 57-9
petitions and dismissed TEC’s and the Diocese’s declaratory judgment
actions as moot.138
TEC and the Diocese appealed the circuit court’s holding to the Supreme
Court of Virginia, arguing that the circuit court erroneously concluded that
Section 57-9(A) applied in the case. In the alternative, they argued that if
the circuit court’s holding constituted an appropriate application of the
statute, the application of Section 57-9 could not pass constitutional
muster.139 On November 9, 2009, the court granted the appeal.140 It
reversed the circuit court’s order in full and reinstated the Diocese’s
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 18–19, 694 S.E.2d at 561.
Id. at 18, 694 S.E.2d at 561.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 561–62.
Id.
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Episcopal Church’s declaratory judgment actions and CANA
Congregations’ counterclaims to those actions.141 Although the court
remanded the proceeding to the circuit court for further resolution of the
issues, it did so with express instructions to decide the dispute by applying
real property law and contract law.142
D. Summary of Court’s Reasoning
At the outset of its review of the circuit court’s holding, the court broadly
summarized the assignments of error raised by TEC and the Diocese into
two principal issues: (a) whether the record supported a finding that Section
57-9(A) controlled over the dispute; and (b) whether the circuit court
correctly held that Section 57-9(A) passed constitutional muster under both
the United States Constitution and Virginia Constitution.143 The court
explained that, per the principle of constitutional avoidance, it would first
review assignments of error challenging the applicability of Section 57-9
before attempting to analyze the constitutionality of the statute.144
The court began its review of the applicability of Section 57-9(A) by
reviewing the definitions of key statutory language that the circuit court
constructed and relied on in granting CANA Congregations’ Section 579(A) petitions.145 Specifically, the court focused on the portion of the
statute that provided:
If a division has heretofore occurred or shall hereafter occur in a church or
religious society, to which any such congregation whose property is held by
trustees is attached, the members of such congregation over 18 years of age
may, by a vote of a majority of the whole number, determine to which branch
146
of the church or society such congregation shall thereafter belong.

The circuit court based its holding that the CANA Congregations’ were
properly before the court on the way in which it interpreted “division,”
“church or religious society,” “attached” and “branch.” The Supreme Court
of Virginia, however, did not follow the same analytical track.147 Rather,
the statutory language that primarily guided the court’s analysis was the
“branch” and “division” language of Section 57-9.148

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.

Id. at 29–30, 694 S.E.2d at 568.
Id.
Id. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 562.
Id. (citing Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 557, 611 S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005)).
Id. at 21, 694 S.E.2d at 562–63.
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
Truro, 280 Va. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563.
Id. The Court reviewed the circuit court’s definition of these terms de novo with the objective of
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Having identified which terms appeared relevant to the dispute, the court
explained that “whether a congregation is entitled to petition for the relief
afforded by [Section] 57-9(A)” is determined by the occurrence of certain
factual prerequisites needed to trigger the statute’s applicability to the
case.149 The court explained that the CANA Congregations needed to prove
that a “‘division [occurred]... in a church or religious society [ ] to which...
[the congregations were] attached’” and “the ‘branch of the church or
society’ to which the congregation[s] vote[d] to belong... [were] a branch of
the ‘church or religious society [ ] to which [the congregations were]
attached’ prior to the ‘division.’”150 As a practical matter, this holding
mandates a two-step analytical process.151 First, the congregation seeking
to invoke Section 57-9 must demonstrate that it was previously attached to
a church or religious society in which a division occurred.152 If that hurdle
can be overcome, the congregation must next demonstrate that it voted to
realign itself with a different branch of the same church or religious society
that experienced the division.153
Applying the two-step analytical framework to the facts in the record, the
court first considered whether a division occurred in any relevant church or
religious society.154 Before assigning any definition to the term “division,”
the court addressed and quickly disposed of two ancillary issues: (a)
whether a division occurred at the Anglican Communion level and (b)
whether a division could only occur if performed through the formal
procedures of TEC.155 As to the first preliminary issue, it concluded that
the record did not support finding a “division” occurred at the Anglican
Communion level and noted the circuit court’s error in finding to the
contrary.156 Given the court’s conclusion that a division at the Anglican
Communion level did not occur, it followed that the CANA Congregations’

assigning their plain and ordinary meaning—in accordance with the historical context that gave rise to
the enactment of the predecessor of Section 57-9—the interrelationship of the words being considered.
Id.
149. Id.
150. Id. at 21–22, 694 S.E.2d at 563 (alterations in original). Recall that “when used in reference to
religious entities, the term ‘polity’ refers to the internal structural governance of the denomination.” Id.
at 12 n.1, 694 S.E.2d at 558 n.1 (citing Judicial Intervention in Disputes Over the Use of Church
Property, supra note 20, at 1143–44).
151. See Henry L. Chambers Jr. & Isaac A. McBeth, Much Ado About Nothing Much: Protestant
Episcopal Church in the Diocese of Virginia v. Truro Church, 45 U. RICH. L. REV. 141, 147–48 (2010).
152. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 21–22, 694 S.E.2d 555, 563 (2010).
153. Id.
154. Id. To meet their burden of establishing the applicability of Section 57-9(A) to their respective
properties, the CANA Congregations were required to first demonstrate they were previously attached to
a church or religious society that experienced a division. Id.
155. Id.
156. Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563.
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Section 57-9(A) petitions would only be proper if the record established
that “division” occurred within some other relevant church or religious
society.157 While the court indicated the next logical step would be to
consider whether a division occurred in TEC and the Diocese, it first
resolved the second preliminary question surrounding the statutory term
“division.”158
The second preliminary issue—and a major point of contention between
the parties—was whether a division, as contemplated by Section 57-9(A),
could only occur if it were a formal division in accordance with the
church’s polity.159 TEC and the Diocese argued that prior case law
interpreting Section 57-9(A) supported the position that, for a division to
occur as contemplated by that provision, it must be achieved formally
through the church’s governing authority.160 However, according to the
court, defining “division” so as to include such a requirement would run
afoul to the mandate of the First Amendment by creating a “risk [of]
entangling the courts in matters of religious governance.”161 The court
explained that “[w]hile it is certainly possible that a division within a
hierarchical church could occur through an orderly process under the
church’s polity, history and common sense suggest that such is rarely the
case.”162 It based this conclusion on the position that “experience shows
that a division within a formerly uniform body almost always arises from a
disagreement between the leadership under the polity and a dissenting
group.”163
Having established the CANA Congregations did not need to show that a
division was accomplished in accordance with church polity for its Section
57-9 petitions to be appropriate, the court turned to the question of whether

157. Id.
158. Id.
159. Brief of Appellant at 2, 5, 21,Truro, 280 Va. 6, 694 S.E.2d 555 (2010) (No. 090682). “When used
in reference to religious entities, the term ‘polity’ refers to the internal structural governance of the
denomination.” Truro, 280 Va. at 12, 694 S.E.2d at 558 n.1 (citing Judicial Intervention in Disputes
Over the Use of Church Property, supra note 20, at 1143–44).
160. Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 25. Canon I.7.3 establishes that a trustee of TEC property
cannot alienate or encumber the property used solely for church purposes without authorizing the
transfer with the bishop and standing committee of the diocese in which the parish is located. THE
GENERAL CONVENTION OF THE EPISCOPAL CHURCH, CONSTITUTION & CANONS 48–49 (The Archives
of the Episcopal Church, eds., 2009) [hereinafter CONSTITUTION & CANONS]. Canon II.6.2 establishes
that a trustee of TEC property cannot alienate or encumber the property used solely for church purposes
without authorizing the transfer with the bishop. Id. at 72.
161. Truro, 280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566; Jae-Woo Cha v. Korean Presbyterian Church, 262 Va.
604, 610, 553 S.E.2d 511, 514 (2001).
162. Truro, 280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566.
163. Id.
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a division had occurred within the Episcopal Church at the Diocese.164 It
noted that the circuit court defined “division,” as “‘[a] split... or rupture in a
religious denomination that involve[s] the separation of a group of
congregations, clergy, or members from the church, and the formation of an
alternative polity that disaffiliating members could join.’”165 Although not
expressly commenting on the propriety of this definition, the court
implicitly ratified it by analyzing whether the evidence set forth in the
record satisfied that legal standard.166 After reviewing the record, the court
concluded “[t]he evidence presented by the CANA Congregations clearly
establishes that a split or rupture has occurred within the Diocese and, given
the evidence of similar events in other dioceses of [TEC], the split or
rupture has occurred at the national level as well.”167
Following its conclusion that a division occurred at both the regional and
national levels of TEC, the court turned to the second of two statutory
prerequisites that the CANA Congregations needed to establish to assert
property rights pursuant to Section 57-9(A): whether the CANA
Congregations voted to affiliate with a “branch” of TEC and the Diocese
following the division.168 Phrased alternatively, the court needed to
determine whether CANA or ADV were branches of TEC and the
Diocese.169
In answering this question, the court emphasized the
importance of the fact that, although CANA’s expansion to allow the newly
separated CANA Congregations to join its ranks occurred in response to the
disputes within TEC, CANA’s expansion did not occur as a result of the
division.170 Thus, it concluded:
while CANA is an ‘alternative polity’ to which the congregations could and did
attach themselves, we hold that, within the meaning of [Section] 57-9(A),
CANA is not a ‘branch’ of either TEC or the Diocese to which the
congregations could vote to join following the ‘division’ in TEC and the
171
Diocese as contemplated by [Section] 57-9(A).

164. Id. at 22, 694 S.E.2d at 563.
165. Id. at 25, 694 S.E.2d at 565.
166. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566.
167. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. The CANA Congregations also provided expert testimony supporting
their position that a division occurred within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 18, 23–24, 694 S.E.2d at
561, 564. Given that there was no serious dispute between the parties that, prior to the 2003 meeting of
the General Convention, the CANA Congregations were attached to TEC and the Diocese, the court
further added that the circuit court had properly held that a division occurred within TEC and the
Diocese and that the CANA Congregations were attached to TEC and the Diocese at the time of the
division. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566.
168. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566.
169. Id.
170. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567.
171. Id.
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Accordingly, with the common Anglican bond between TEC and CANA
notwithstanding, the CANA Congregations failed to demonstrate that they
voted to belong to a branch of the TEC or the Diocese following the
division and they could not seek relief under the statute.172
The court provided additional clarification to prevent its interpretation of
Section 57-9(A) from being misunderstood as holding that an organization
qualifies as a branch of a church only if it operates under the control of the
church that experienced the division. In this regard, the court noted that
operation as a separate polity would not necessarily bar a given religious
organization from qualifying as a branch of a church or religious society
that operates under a different polity or hierarchical structure.173 However,
in that scenario, “[Section 57-9(A)] requires that each branch proceed from
the same polity, and not merely a shared tradition of faith.”174 Because
CANA and ADV did not proceed from the same polity as TEC, the CANA
Congregations could not rely on Section 57-9(A) to establish their rights in
their respective properties.175 Accordingly, the court remanded the
proceeding to the circuit court to be decided in accordance with property
law and contract law.176
The final outcome of Truro is yet to be decided. Nonetheless, it is at
least worth mentioning that it appears now that the case will be decided
under the “neutral principles of law” approach as opposed to the “special
statute” approach. Indeed, the court indicated that principles of property
and contract law would control the outcome of the dispute. 177 The circuit
court will therefore need to examine the exact nature of the trust existing
between the CANA Congregations, the Diocese, and TEC. Furthermore,
the circuit court will have to identify whether the CANA Congregations are
contractually obligated to possess their respective properties in accordance
with the canons and constitution of TEC—which specifically require a local
parish to hold its respective property in trust for the Diocese and TEC.178
Presumably, such legal principles are “neutral” in the sense that they
could be applied in any dispute, not just church property disputes.179 It will

172. Id.
173. Id. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 567.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
177. Id.
178. See Wallace v. Hughes, 131 Ky. 445, 469, 115 S.W. 684, 691 (1909) (explaining that “religious
organizations are merely voluntary associations, whose constitutions and laws are in their ultimate
result, so far as the civil tribunals are concerned, in the nature of contracts between the members”).
179. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
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be interesting to see, however, if such principles can be applied to Truro
without implicating ecclesiastical questions. Specifically, the circuit court
may struggle to do so because the specifics of the trust relationship between
the parties and any contractual obligation of the CANA Congregations to
give unqualified accession to TEC canons and constitutions regarding the
use of church property is delineated in TEC’s Constitution.180 This is
problematic because the court will be required to read and interpret
provisions of TEC’s Constitution, a situation that creates risk of deciding
issues of religious doctrine and practice while attempting to extract the
purely relevant legal language from the document.181
The court’s decision that Truro be decided on principles of property and
contract law is also noteworthy for another reason.182 Such a holding, albeit
not expressly, manifests the court’s preference that lower courts make use
of the neutral principles approach over the deference approach, if possible.
As noted above, the Supreme Court left the decision of how to prioritize
between the two approaches to the states.183 One could read the holding in
Truro as establishing the priority that courts in Virginia should assign to the
various approaches available for resolving church property disputes.
Relying on the Supreme Court of Virginia’s approach in Truro as an
analytical template, a court confronted with a church property dispute
should first attempt to apply Section 57-9 to resolve the dispute.184 If the
facts of the case do not allow for application of the statute, the court should
then apply neutral principles of law to resolve the dispute.185 Accordingly,

180. CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 160, at 72. Canon II.6(1) requires property dedicated for
worship or other ministry to “secured for ownership and use by a Parish, Mission, Congregation, or
Institution affiliated with this Church and subject to its Constitution and Canons.” Id. Canon II.6(2)
establishes that a congregation may not alienate or encumber church property without the consent of the
respective Diocese that oversees the congregation. Id. Additionally, Diocesan Canon 15.1 provides that
“[a]ll real and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Church or Mission . . . is held in trust
for The Episcopal Church and the Diocese.” CONSTITUTION AND CANONS
OF THE PROTESTANT EPISCOPAL CHURCH IN THE DIOCESE OF VIRGINIA 28 (The Diocese of Va., ed.,
2008) [hereinafter DIOCESAN CONSTITUTION & CANONS].
181. “First Amendment values are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn
on the resolution by civil courts of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.” Presbyterian
Church, 393 U.S. at 449.
182. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 29, 694 S.E.2d 555, 567 (2010) (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1(Repl. Vol.
2007)).
183. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U. S. 595, 604 (1979).
184. Truro, 280 Va. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 557, 611
S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005)).
185. Id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
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a Virginia court will only turn to the deference approach in the event that
application of the relevant neutral principles of law would require the court
decide questions of religious doctrine and practice.186
Although the Supreme Court of Virginia never reached the question of
Section 57-9(A)’s constitutionality, its interpretation of the statute raises
several constitutional issues that future courts applying the statute may be
required to address.187 Indeed, it is likely that a party challenging the
applicability of the statute to in a future case would argue in the alternate
that the statute, if applicable, is unconstitutional. Accordingly, it is
necessary to identify the constitutional issues implicated by Section 57-9(A)
and whether the issues provide sufficient basis for a court to hold the statute
does not pass constitutional muster.
III. CONSTITUTIONAL ISSUES SURROUNDING SECTION 57-9(A)
Prior to the decision in Truro, Section 57-9 drew criticism as a statute
destined to draw courts into the ecclesiastical thicket in violation of both the
United States and Virginia constitutions.188 The proper application of the
statute, however, remained relatively unknown until the Supreme Court of
Virginia issued the Truro opinion.189 The question now lingers if, in light
of Truro’s guidance, the statute can be applied in a way that does not offend
the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment.190 This Part argues that Section 57-9(A) operates in violation
of both religion clauses of the First Amendment. Part III.A identifies the
Establishment Clause issues implicated by Section 57-9(A), and Part III.B
highlights the Free Exercise Clause issues implicated by Section 57-9(A).
Part III.C discusses potential methods to apply the statute as it stands postTruro in light of the Establishment Clause and Free Exercise Clause issues
surrounding it.

186. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 727 (1871).
187. Truro, 280 Va. at 6, 694 S.E.2d at 555 (declining to address the constitutionality of Section 579(A)).
188. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1844–45, 1890.
189. Prior to the Truro opinion, the Supreme Court of Virginia applied Section 57-9, or its precursor
statute, to only a limited number of church property cases. See, e.g., Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 327
S.E.2d 107 (1985); Baber v. Caldwell, 207 Va. 694, 152 S.E.2d 23 (1967); Allaun v. First & Merchs.
Nat’l Bank, 190 Va. 104, 56 S.E.2d 83 (1949).
190. Property statutes such as Section 57-9(A) are not unique to the Commonwealth. Several states
have statutes meant to resolve property disputes in the event of a division within a church. See e.g., In
re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 488–89, 198 P.3d 66, 81 (2009) (noting California's statute
as an example). While such statutes are not per se excessive entanglement, “First Amendment values
are plainly jeopardized when church property litigation is made to turn on the resolution by civil courts
of controversies over religious doctrine and practice.” Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
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A. Establishment Clause
1. Section 57-9(A) Entangles the Courts in Church Doctrine
The primary Establishment Clause issue presented in Truro’s holding
deals with how the court applied the statutory term “branch.”191 In
discussing the issue of what constitutes a branch, the court noted that
“[w]hile the branch joined may operate as a separate polity from the branch
to which the congregation formerly was attached, the statute requires that
each branch proceed from the same polity and not merely a shared tradition
of faith.”192 In other words, the branch that the dissident congregation votes
to affiliate with must be “derived” from the “church or religious society”
that the dissident congregation is dividing from.193 In the case of Truro, the
death knell to the CANA congregations’ petitions was that CANA merely
maintained a shared tradition of faith with TEC, presumably through the
Anglican Communion.194 According to the court, however, CANA did not
“proceed” from TEC and it was not “derived” from TEC.195
The nature of the “derived” standard is unclear though. The court did not
provide any guidance as to what the difference is between being “derived”
from a church as opposed to merely sharing “a tradition of religious faith”
with that church.196 While one may look at the fact pattern in Truro and
comprehend the difference under the specific facts of that case (i.e., one can
understand the court’s reasoning in finding CANA is not derived from
TEC),197 the answer may not come so easily in future cases. Although there
does not appear to be any prior legal context for the word in Virginia case
law, the standard definition of “derive” is “to trace from a source or
origin.”198 Using such a term in relation to religious organizations is
problematic because one church may have: (a) a traceable doctrinal
connection to another church; (b) a traceable institutional connections to
another church; or (c) both. In other words, using the term “derived” in
regards to religious institutions could reasonably be interpreted as doctrinal
derivation or institutional derivation.199 While it seems intuitive to argue

191. For the Supreme Court of Virginia’s discussion of the term “branch,” see Truro, 280 Va. at 28–29,
694 S.E.2d at 567.
192. Id.
193. Id.
194. Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 23.
195. Truro, 280 Va. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. RANDOM HOUSE UNABRIDGED DICTIONARY 536 (2d ed. 1993).
199. For the purposes of this article, “doctrinal derivation” is used to describe a church that identifies
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that a spin-off religious organization of a church of religious society should
be doctrinally derived from the parent institution to qualify as a “branch,”200
there would be no constitutional method of enforcing such a standard. A
judicial review of doctrinal derivation is no different than a judicial review
of the “departed from doctrine” element of implied trust theory.201 Such an
analysis would require the court decide to degree to which one church
doctrinally departs from another church and whether such departures were
significant enough that former could not be considered a branch of the
latter. To do so would a place a court in the position of assigning weight to
various tenets of a particular faith, a role expressly disallowed in
Presbyterian Church.202
Given that a court cannot rely on doctrinal derivation because of the First
Amendment’s prohibition of government action favoring one religious over
another (or no religion at all), one is left to conclude that a court should
apply “derived” as meaning the putative branch is institutionally derived
from the parent church.203 Under this standard, the relevant inquiry would
be whether an identifiable organizational affiliation between the putative
branch and the parent church or religious society that experienced the
division existed at some point in time prior to the division.204 But even this
standard has its own ecclesiastical pitfalls. For example, the strength of the
connection required between the putative branch and the parent is uncertain.
Must the putative branch be directly derived from the parent church that
experienced the division, or can it be an institutional descendent of an
organization that was directly derived from the parent church? If the latter
itself with a specific polity because of doctrinal similarities, not by way of former congregational
migration. “Institutional derivation ” refers to the situation in which one can trace the congregational
migrations achieved through formal separations of one church to a point of origin in a specific polity.
200. Indeed, this is the point TEC attempted to argue in Truro. See 280 Va. at 24, 694 S.E.2d at 564. In
a hierarchical polity, the internal governing authorities of that polity must be allowed to identify when a
church is or is not a branch thereof. Id. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. Otherwise, there is a strong risk that
there will be many “branches” of that hierarchical church which are not subject to the canons and
constitution of the polity. Id. at 15, 694 S.E.2d at 559. TEC would argue that a “branch” of TEC not
formally recognized by its governing authorities is no branch at all. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. Rather
it is a wholly different freestanding religious organization. Id.
201. For a discussion of “departed from doctrine” element of implied trust theory, see Hassler, supra
note 22, at 408–10; see also McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1863–67.
202. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 450 (1969).
203. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Village Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994)
(“[G]overnment should not prefer one religion to another, or religion to irreligion.”); see also Epperson
v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104 (1968); Abington Sch. Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 216–17 (1963).
204. One might be prompted to ask why such a connection would need to be demonstrated under the
“derived” standard. The answer is that, absent such a requirement, it would be impossible to distinguish
the difference between a church or religious society that merely maintains a tradition of shared faith with
the parent church or religious society as opposed to one that is derived from the parent church or
religious society. Pursuant to the court’s holding in Truro, the former does not qualify as a branch under
the statute while the latter can. 280 Va. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 567.
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situation is permissible, how will the court test the genealogy of the putative
branch without becoming enmeshed in questions of church doctrine and
structure?
Furthermore, it is important to consider whether the putative branch must
have separated from the parent organization in accordance with church
polity to “proceed” or “derive” from a particular church. This should not be
confused with the question whether a church needed to separate from a
religious institution in accordance with church polity for a “division” to
occur. The court plainly answered that question.205 Here, the issue is
identifying what the requisite past relationship must be between two
religious organizations for one to be considered branch of another.
Requiring an unbroken chain of formal separations to connect the putative
branch and the church that experienced the division provides a bright line
rule on one hand, but a constitutional dilemma on the other. A court
attempting to analyze a separation—or a chain of separations—to determine
if it can build a sufficient connection between the putative branch and
parent church would necessarily have to familiarize itself with religious
institutions’ various separation policies and procedures and attempt to apply
them. It seems unlikely that a court could make such analysis without
thoroughly familiarizing itself with various church doctrines and resolving
ecclesiastical questions in the process.206
A faction does need to separate from the church in accordance with the
polity’s formal procedures for it to “proceed” or “derive” from that parent
church, however, the definition of “branch” becomes unworkably broad and
creates the potential for absurd results. For example, could a group of
individuals visit a church for one Sunday, attend worship service, and start
their own religious organization the following week and technically be

205. Id. at 26, 694 S.E.2d at 566.
206. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Virginia realized the constitutional risk inherent in attempting to
determine whether one religious body separated from another in accordance with church polity. Truro,
280 Va. at 26, 694 S.E.2d 565–66. Of course, the court could simply defer to the position of the parent
religious institution that is involved in the dispute on this issue to avoid the ecclesiastical issues
altogether. Id. at 27, 694 S.E.2d at 566. However, such institutions usually have a significant interest in
the outcome of the litigation and this raises concerns about the fairness of the proceeding. The dispute
involving Norcrest Presbyterian Church (“Norcrest”) is illustrative of this situation. See Gardner, supra
note 53, at 239–40 (citing GUIDE TO CHURCH PROPERTY LAW, supra note 42, at 22 (discussing
Norcrest’s experience with the adjudicatory process)). The members of Norcrest were dissatisfied with
the official position of the Presbyterian Church on several issues and wanted to separate from
Presbyterianism by use of internal polity procedures. See id. at 238–39. After attempting to invoke
internal procedures to do so, the governing Presbytery visited Norcrest, seized the pastor’s and church
property, and changed the locks to the building. Id. The majority faction that invoked the separation
procedures had no choice but to hold their next service at the local dog pound. However, the minority
faction that desired to remain attached to the Presbyterian Church was granted access to Norcrest for
worship services. Id.
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“derived” from the church they visited the week prior? Most would argue
that such a result is not in accordance with the purpose and spirit of Section
57-9.207 Certainly, the Supreme Court of Virginia indicated that the
strength of the “historical connection” between the putative branch and the
parent church is dispositive.208 But how does one test the strength of the
historical connection between the putative branch and the parent if the
standard is not requiring an unbroken chain of formal separations between
the putative branch and the parent church? Presumably, to avoid the absurd
scenario posed by the question above, a court would need to evaluate the
duration and level of involvement in the parent church that the purported
branch invested during its time with the parent church. Such an analysis
arguably begins to look similar to a “departure from doctrine” analysis in
that the court is looking at the level of involvement that one faction invested
in a church and using its judgment to decide whether such involvement rose
to a level sufficient so that it could be considered a “branch” of that church
when it left.209 Doing so would consist of assigning weight to various
religious activities—such as contributing to church funds or attending
worship service—and attempting to compare the involvement of one faction
of the church with another. Such an analysis definitely raises concerns
about offending the principle that a court cannot decide ecclesiastical
questions in attempting to resolve a property dispute. If the court attempts
to avoid this analysis to remain within the bounds of the First Amendment,
however, it is not difficult to envision the result where a rogue faction floats
from church and forms its own polity thereafter—thus, becoming a branch
of numerous churches.210
2. Section 57-9(A) Favors Specific Forms of Religious Government
Potential for excessive entanglement is not the only Establishment
Clause concern raised by Section 57-9(A). There is also cause for concern
that the statute constitutes a government preference for congregational
churches. To this end, the First Amendment requires that government be
neutral in matters of religion.
Indeed, the government may not
207. See McElroy, supra note 6, at 335–36; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1849–50.
208. Truro, 280 Va. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 566–67.
209. See Hassler, supra note 22, at 408–10; see also McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1863–67.
210. A hypothetical may help illustrate the point. A group of ten individuals decide to attend the
Presbyterian Church for five weeks. Subsequently, they attend services with the Episcopal Church for
five weeks. Following the ten-week period, the individuals form their own polity as a combination of
lessons learned at the Presbyterian Church and the Episcopal Church. Are they a branch of the
Presbyterian Church, the Episcopal Church, both, or neither? Would it matter if, instead of ten
individuals, it was one thousand individuals? Would it matter if, instead of attending each church five
weeks, the faction attended each church six months?
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constitutionally prefer one religion over another or over no religion at all.211
The mandate of government neutrality towards religion is grounded in both
the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment.212 Accordingly, it can be difficult to analyze the issue of
government neutrality as purely an establishment issue or a free exercise
issue. These difficulties notwithstanding, it is well-settled that the mandate
that the “government should not prefer one religion to another” is “a
principle at the heart of the Establishment Clause.”213
There are two potential ways in which Section 57-9(A) violates the
Establishment Clause requirement of government neutrality towards
different forms of religion: (a) by favoring one form of hierarchical church
over another form of hierarchical church; and (b) by imposing burdens on
hierarchical churches that it does not impose on congregational churches.214
As to the first issue, some hierarchical churches, such as the Roman
Catholic Church, opt not to hold their property by trustees.215 Section 579(A), by its plain language, only applies to hierarchical churches that hold
their property in trust.216 Hierarchical churches such as the Roman Catholic
Church therefore face no risk of losing their property by way of Section 579(A) when congregational majorities leave the church.217 On the other
hand, hierarchical churches that have structured their internal governing
system so as to hold their property in trust—such as TEC—can lose their
property when a congregational majority departs from the church.218
Indeed, TEC would have lost significant property pursuant to Section 579(A) if the CANA Congregations had been more strategic in the
realignment process.219 Accordingly, it could be argued that Section 579(A) operates to effectively penalize churches such as TEC for adopting the
internal structure they have while simultaneously preferring churches such

211. McCreary County v. ACLU, 545 U.S. 844, 860 (2005) (“The touchstone of our analysis is the
principle that the First Amendment mandates governmental neutrality between religion and religion, and
between religion and nonreligion.” (citations omitted)).
212. Church of Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 532–34 (1993) (explaining the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment requires government neutrality towards religion); Larson
v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246 (1982) (explaining the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment
requires government neutrality towards religion).
213. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994).
214. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1847.
215. Id.
216. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
217. Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 38–39; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1847.
218. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1844.
219. The Supreme Court of Virginia found the statute inapplicable because CANA and ADV were not
branches of TEC. Truro, 280 Va. at 28, 694 S.E.2d at 567. If the CANA Congregations would have
aligned themselves with a branch of the TEC, the outcome of the case would likely have been very
different.
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as the Roman Catholic Church for adopting the structure they have.220 Such
a preference runs strictly afoul to “[t]he clearest command of the
Establishment Clause” which is “that one religious denomination cannot be
officially preferred over another.”221
As to the second potential issue, Section 57-9 could be read as providing
preferential treatment to congregational churches or hierarchical issues.222
Although Section 57-9 does not expressly make reference to
“congregational” churches or “hierarchical” churches, the language of its
two provisions establishes that Section 57-9(A) applies to hierarchical
churches while Section 57-9(B) applies to congregational churches. This is
evident in that Section 57-9(A) applies when a division has occurred “in a
church or religious society, to which any... congregation... is attached.”223
Section 57-9(B), on the other hand, applies when division occurs in church
or religious society “which, in its organization and government, is a church
or society entirely independent of any other church or general society.”224
Section 57-9(B) wholly defers to the religious practice of congregational
churches.225 It provides:
[The] majority of the members of such congregation, entitled to vote by its
constitution as existing at the time of the division, or where it has no written
constitution, entitled to vote by its ordinary practice or custom, may decide the
226
right, title, and control of all property held in trust for such congregation.

While Section 57-9(B) defers to the constitutions, practices, or religious
customs of congregational churches undergoing a division to resolve a
church property dispute, hierarchical churches receive no such deference.227
Indeed, the constitutions, practices, or customs of the hierarchical
experiencing the division church are not even mentioned in Section 579(A).228 Rather, Section 57-9(A) removes power to control the disposition
of church property from the governing bodies of hierarchical churches and
reallocates it in the hands of local congregational majorities. Regardless of
what a hierarchical church’s constitution, practice, or custom mandates in
220. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1885–86 (discussing how Section 57-9(A) unnecessarily burdens
hierarchical churches that hold their property in trust while not imposing the same burden on
hierarchical churches that do not hold their property in trust).
221. Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 244 (1982).
222. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1885 (“Under Section 57-9, hierarchical organizations are not free to
organize their polity according to their beliefs, while congregational forms of governance are permitted
to do so.”).
223. VA. CODE ANN. § 57-9(A) (Repl. Vol. 2007 & Cum. Supp. 2010).
224. Id. § 57-9(B).
225. Id.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. See § 57-9(A) (omitting a reference to a church’s constitution, practices, or customs).
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regards to property ownership, Section 57-9(A) allows local congregational
majorities to determine ownership of church property if the factual
prerequisites identified in the statute are present.229 Thus, certain
hierarchical churches are placed in a position of having to reconfigure their
internal structure so they will fall outside Section 57-9(A)—for example,
rewriting their constitutions so that church property is titled in the name of
an ecclesiastical officer as opposed to being held in trust for the church by a
local congregation—or risk having their internal policies ignored and losing
their property to a dissident congregation.230 Section 57-9(B) does not
place a similar burden to restructure on congregational churches.231
Section 57-9’s disparate treatment between different forms of
hierarchical churches and between hierarchical churches and congregational
churches renders the statute constitutionally suspect.232 This conclusion is
supported by the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Larson v. Valente.233 That
case involved a statute that required charitable organizations to register and
file “extensive annual reports” with the state.234 However, if a religious
organization received more than half of its total contributions from
members or affiliates, it would be exempted from the burdens imposed by
the statute.235 Thus, the statute was “not simply a facially neutral statute,
the provisions of which happen to have a ‘disparate impact’ upon different
religious organizations.”236 Rather, the language of the statute made
“explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious
organizations.”237 The Court explained that “when we are presented with a
state law granting denominational preference, our precedents demand that
we treat the law as suspect and that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its
constitutionality.”238 Ultimately, the Court invalidated the statute on the
ground that the “fifty percent rule” unconstitutionally discriminated among
religious groups.239

229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.

Id.
Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 457–58.
McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1885.
Id. at 1885–86.
Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
Id. at 231.
Id. at 231–32.
Id. at 247 n.23.
Id.
Id. at 246.
Id. at 255.
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Similar to the “fifty percent” statute in Larson, Section 57-9 is not a
facially neutral statute that, in operation, has a disparate impact on certain
religious organizations.240 Rather, the language of the statute makes
“explicit and deliberate distinctions between different religious
organizations.”241 Accordingly, the Court’s analysis in Larson indicates
that Section 57-9(A) would need to survive strict scrutiny analysis to pass
constitutional muster.242 Strict scrutiny analysis, “which usually sounds the
death knell for constitutionally suspect laws,”243 requires a law be
invalidated “unless it is justified by a compelling governmental interest”
and the law is “closely fitted to further that interest.”244 While the state has
a compelling interest in resolving religious property disputes, “[t]he state
has no compelling interest in restricting the set of legally cognizable forms
for determining property rights within religious institutions.”245
Furthermore, the statute is not narrowly tailored to achieve its putative
government interest. The government may achieve its interest in resolving
religious property disputes in a manner that does not draw the courts into
the ecclesiastical thicket without “imposing a rule of congregational
majority on hierarchical churches, even when a hierarchical church has
already created a rule of decision for resolving property disputes in a legally
cognizable form.”246 Indeed, a statute codifying the “deference rule,” where
applicable, would be far more narrowly tailored to achieve the same interest
in that the statute would not impose a congregational form of property
dispute resolution on hierarchical churches or vice versa. Ultimately, the
fact that Section 57-9(A) discriminates against certain religious bodies far
more than is necessary to achieve its putative compelling government
interest makes it unlikely that a court would find that it passes strict scrutiny
analysis.

240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.
246.

Id. at 247 n.23.
Id.
Id. at 229.
Falwell v. Miller, 203 F. Supp. 2d 624, 631 (W.D. Va. 2002).
Larson, 456 U.S. at 247.
McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1886.
Id. (citations omitted).
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B. Free Exercise Clause247
1. Section 57-9(A) as a Neutral Principle of Law
Section 57-9(A), if categorized as a neutral principle of law, raises
notable free exercise issues.248 The Free Exercise Clause of the First
Amendment provides that “Congress shall make no law... prohibiting the
free exercise [of religion].”249 The First Amendment’s prohibition on
government with the free exercise of religion is also binding on state
governments by way of the Fourteenth Amendment. Moreover, a similar
provision appears in the Virginia Constitution, which provides that “all men
are equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates
of conscience.”250 Religious institutions, like individuals, have free
exercise rights under the First Amendment.251 According to Justice
Brennan, “[r]eligion includes important communal elements for most
believers. They exercise their religion through religious organizations, and
these organizations must be protected [by the Free Exercise Clause].”252
Thus, in order for any statute in Virginia to pass constitutional muster, it
must not impermissibly impede on a religious institution’s free exercise
rights.
Of the three approaches that civil courts may use to resolve religious
property disputes—the deference approach, the neutral principles approach,
and the special statute approach—Section 57-9(A) could only arguably be
considered as either a neutral principle of law or special statute. Indeed, it
is necessary to evaluate Section 57-9(A) under the known standards of each
potential category because it remains unclear whether there is any
difference between the “neutral principles of law” approach as opposed to
the “special statutes” approach. 253 If the two are categorically different,
Section 57-9(A) is more likely to be considered the latter over the former.
Given the ambiguity of the law in this area, however, it is worth considering

247. For an excellent discussion on the free exercise implications posed by Section 57-9(A), see
McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1855–91.
248. See Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 450–51; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1880–84.
249. U.S. CONST. amend. I (alteration in original).
250. VA. CONST. art. I, § 16.
251. Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 606 (1979).
252. Corp. of Presiding Bishop of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Amos, 443 U.S. 327, 342 (1987)
(Brennan, J., concurring) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
253. Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.6 (Colo. 1986).
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whether a party could argue and establish that Section 57-9(A) is a neutral
principle of law that does not violate the free exercise rights of the religious
institutions it regulates—namely, hierarchical churches.254
A neutral principle of law, by design, “is completely secular in
operation” and “promises to free civil courts completely from entanglement
in questions of religious doctrine, polity, and practice.”255 Furthermore, it is
a principle of law “flexible enough to accommodate all forms of religious
organization and polity.”256 One might argue that Section 57-9(A) is a
neutral principle of law in that it operates as a presumptive rule of majority
representation. This rule acts as a legal assumption that “a voluntary
religious association is represented by a majority of its members.”257 Thus,
when competing factions of a religious dispute both claim to be the
congregation entitled to possess and use church property, the court would
determine which faction was the majority faction and presume that faction
is one that represents the church.258 However, the issue of majority
representation as it relates to the local church only becomes germane once it
has been determined that the property should remain with the local church,
as opposed to remaining with the parent church or religious society.259 The
Supreme Court stated that a presumption of majority representation may be
constitutional if it is “defeasible upon a showing that the identity of the
local church is to be determined by some other means.”260 In other words,
“[s]uch a presumption is permissible after it has been determined that the
property rights remain with a seceding local church and as long as the
presumption can be overcome by certain provisions articulated by the
Court.”261
There is a colorable argument that Section 57-9(A) operates beyond
constitutional boundaries as a presumptive rule of majority representation,
as those boundaries are defined in Jones. There, the Court unequivocally
established that “any rule of majority representation can always be
overcome” by a contrary provision in a corporate charter, a provision in the
church’s constitution, or provision in the deed of the property identifying

254. Religious institutions, like individuals, have free exercise rights under the First Amendment.
Jones, 443 U.S. at 606.
255. Id. at 603.
256. Id.
257. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1868.
258. Id. at 1872.
259. Id.
260. These other “means” could include a provision in a corporate charter, a provision in the church’s
constitution, or provision in the deed of the property identifying that the local church holds the property
in trust for the parent church. Jones, 443 U.S. at 607–08.
261. See McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1872.
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that the local church holds the property in trust for the parent church.262
Such a holding is consistent with the notion that, as part of its free exercise
rights, a religious institution has a right to govern its own internal
structure—which includes configuring the manner in which church property
is used, managed, and owned.263 However, Virginia’s statutory framework
governing ownership of church property limits the manner in which a
religious institution can overcome the presumption of majority control.
Specifically, a hierarchical church may only overcome the presumption of
majority control by “titling the property in the name of an ecclesiastical
officer of the general church or holding the property in corporate form.”264
Virginia’s statutory framework, which limits the manner in which
hierarchical churches may overcome the presumption of majority control
created by Section 57-9(A), is constitutionally problematic. One might
argue that hierarchical churches are shortchanged in that they are not
afforded the ability to “always” overcome Section 57-9(A)’s presumption
of majority control by the methods outlined in Jones. A fair reading of
Jones supports two conclusions surrounding the constitutionality of a
presumptive rule of majority representation: (a) a state may empower a
religious institution to overcome a presumption of majority representation
by any legally cognizable method; and (b) there are certain methods—a
contrary provision in a corporate charter, a provision in the church’s
constitution, or provision in the deed of the property identifying that the
local church holds the property in trust for the parent church—that will
“always” overcome a presumption of majority representation.265 In other
words, it is fair to read Jones as holding that—at a bare constitutional
minimum—religious entities must be allowed to direct how their property is
held by one of those three methods.266 The fact that they cannot do so
under Virginia law could be perceived as an impermissible interference
with a religious organization’s free exercise rights.267
Admittedly, reasonable minds could differ as to the proper interpretation
of the Court’s holding in Jones. Some read Jones as supporting the position
that a state need only provide an “escape hatch” for religious institutions to
overcome the presumption of majority representation.268 Under this
262. Jones, 443 U.S. at 607 (emphasis added).
263. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 459.
264. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1872–73 (demonstrating how Section 57-9 is inconsistent with Jones
v. Wolf's holding that a hierarchical church must have a certain methods available to it to overcome a
presumptive rule of majority representation).
265. Jones, 443 U.S. at 607–08.
266. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1874.
267. Id.
268. See In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal II, 76 Va. Cir. 894, 923–24 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2009).
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reading, the three methods discussed by the Court for overcoming the
presumptive rule of majority control—a contrary provision in a corporate
charter, a provision in the church’s constitution, or provision in the deed of
the property identifying that the local church holds the property in trust for
the parent church— are not compulsory.269 Rather, the state need only
provide some method of overcoming the rule that does not otherwise inhibit
the institution’s free exercise rights or thrust the court into the ecclesiastical
thicket.270 Proponents of this view focus on the Court’s statement that “the
State may adopt any method of overcoming the majoritarian presumption,
so long as the use of that method does not impair free-exercise rights or
entangle the civil courts in matters of religious controversy.”271 While the
“escape hatch” view is consistent with this statement, it contradicts the
court’s earlier statement a presumptive rule of majority representation “can
always be overcome” by the three methods outlined above. Accordingly,
while the escape hatch method is a colorable reading of Jones that may
prevent Section 57-9(A) from being found unconstitutional, such a reading
is inconsistent with the context of the whole opinion and should be
disfavored over reading Jones in a manner that reconciles the two
statements.272 Such a reading perceives Jones as holding that: (a) a state
may empower a religious institution to overcome a presumption of majority
representation by any legally cognizable method; and (b) there are certain
methods—a contrary provision in a corporate charter, a provision in the
church’s constitution, or provision in the deed of the property identifying
that the local church holds the property in trust for the parent church—that
will “always” overcome a presumption of majority representation.273
The issue of how Jones should be interpreted notwithstanding, another
relevant free exercise question that must be considered is whether Section
57-9(A) encroaches on the right of churches to develop its internal structure
as it sees fit. In electing to uphold the “neutral principles” doctrine over the
objection of four dissenting justices, the Court explained that the
constitutionality of the doctrine depended on its proper application to
religious organizations. Specifically, it stated:
Under the neutral-principles approach, the outcome of a church property
dispute is not foreordained. At any time before the dispute erupts, the parties
can ensure, if they so desire, that the faction loyal to the hierarchical church
will retain the church property. They can modify the deeds or the corporate

269.
270.
271.
272.
273.

McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1873.
Id.
Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 608 (1979).
McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1875.
Id.
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charter to include a right of reversion or trust in favor of the general church.
Alternatively, the constitution of the general church can be made to recite an
express trust in favor of the denominational church. The burden involved in
taking such steps will be minimal. And the civil courts will be bound to give
effect to the result indicated by the parties, provided it is embodied in some
274
legally cognizable form.

This language suggests that the Court’s basis for finding the doctrine of
neutral principles constitutional was the flexibility of the doctrine enabling
the governing bodies of hierarchical churches to “ensure... that the faction
loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property.”275 Indeed,
the Court places the burden on religious institutions to “structure
relationships involving church property so as not to require the civil courts
to resolve ecclesiastical questions.”276 The relevant question is whether
state governments can dictate how a religious institution must structure its
relationship in this regard. For example, the Episcopal Church had
numerous canons in place to ensure that, in the event of property dispute,
the property at issue would remain under the control of the of TEC, the
Diocese, and the congregational faction loyal to TEC.277 However, Virginia
only allows a hierarchical church to overcome the presumption of majority
control by “titling the property in the name of an ecclesiastical officer of the
general church or holding the property in corporate form”—a structural
measure not provided for in TEC’s canons and constitution.278
These limitations seem at odds with the scope of choice religious
institutions were supposed to be offered in order to preserve the
constitutionality of neutral principles of law being a viable solution to
resolving church property disputes.279 Specifically, the Court clearly stated
religious institutions must be given the opportunity to ensure “that the
faction loyal to the hierarchical church will retain the church property” by
274. Jones, 443 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added); see also Hassler, supra note 22, at 430–31 (noting that
one of the benefits to the neutral principles approach is flexibility).
275. Jones, 443 U.S. at 606.
276. Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969).
277. Canon II.6(1) requires property dedicated for worship or other ministry to “secured for ownership
and use by a Parish, Mission, Congregation, or Institution affiliated with this Church and subject to its
Constitution and Canons.” CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 160, at 64. Canon II.6(2) establishes
that a congregation may not alienate or encumber church property without the consent of the respective
Diocese that oversees the congregation. Id. Additionally, Diocesan Canon 15.1 provides that “[a]ll real
and personal property held by or for the benefit of any Church or Mission . . . is held in trust for The
Episcopal Church and the Diocese.” DIOCESAN CONSTITUTION & CANONS, supra note 180, at 41.
278. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1873. One distinctive feature of the TEC is that its structure calls for
“lay involvement in [church] governance.” Brief of Appellant, supra note 159, at 32. According to
TEC, to title the property in the name of an ecclesiastical officer “would require the Diocese either to
remove property authority from lay persons or somehow to restructure its polity to preserve lay
involvement. Id.
279. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 460–61.
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configuring its property holdings in “some legally cognizable form.”280 The
Court did not limit the ability of religious organizations to exercise this
right according to a narrow and specific set of options, or only those options
provided for by a state’s statutory framework.281 Rather, the Court
deliberately used broad language, giving hierarchical religious
organizations the ability to structure its property holdings in “some” legally
cognizable form.282 Allowing religious organizations this broad range of
decision-making makes sense because a constitutional neutral principle of
law, by its very definition, is one that must be “flexible enough to
accommodate all forms of religious organization and polity.”283 Certain
hierarchical churches, such as TEC, structure their property holdings in a
legally cognizable form—such as having its property held in trust by local
parishes—but still remain at risk of a disloyal faction retaining control of
the property because of Section 57-9(A).284 Thus, Section 57-9(A) falls
well short of being flexible enough to accommodate “all forms” of church
Indeed, hierarchical churches that configure their
government.285
government in a manner similar to TEC must restructure to accommodate
Section 57-9(A) or remain at risk of losing significant church property.286
Placing hierarchical churches in this sort of dilemma is a far cry from the
sort of flexibility envisioned by the Court when discussing the
constitutionality of applying neutral principles of law to resolve church
property disputes.287
It may very well be that the Court stressed the need for neutral principles
of law to be flexible enough to accommodate all forms of government
because it realized to hold otherwise and craft a rule of law that required
churches to reorganize their internal structures would unduly inhibit those
churches’ free exercise rights. Indeed, the manner in which a hierarchical
church structures itself—included in which is the manner in which the
church manages its property—seems to be purely ecclesiastical in nature.288
The Supreme Court confirmed this position when it stated religious
freedom encompasses the “power [of religious organizations] to decide for
themselves, free from state interference, matters of church government as

280. Jones, 443 U.S. at 606 (emphasis added).
281. Id.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 603 (emphasis added).
284. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 458–59.
285. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1876.
286. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 459.
287. Id. at 458–59.
288. Id. at 459 (noting that a church’s internal governing structure and property ownership system are
doctrinal in nature).
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well as those of faith and doctrine.” 289 Likewise, the Supreme Court of
Virginia also acknowledged that the manner in which a religious
organization crafts its internal governing structure—particularly, in
hierarchical churches—is wholly doctrinal in nature. 290 These “issues of
church governance... [are] unquestionably outside the jurisdiction of the
civil courts.”291
In summary, Section 57-9(A) fails to be a viable neutral principle of law
that the courts may rely on to resolve church property disputes for the
reasons set above. Specifically, hierarchical religious organizations are
unconstitutionally limited in the manner by which they can overcome a
presumptive rule of majority representation and by the way they can
configure their own internal structures to ensure that, in the event of a
schism within the church, the faction loyal to the hierarchy can maintain
control over church property.292 Furthermore, not only does the statute
enable any congregation that leaves a hierarchical church to overcome its
original contractual agreement to be subject to the canons and constitutions
of that church,293 the statute ignores the reality that “[r]espect for the First
Amendment free exercise rights of persons to enter into a religious
association of their choice... requires civil courts to give effect to the
provisions and agreements of that religious association.”294 Accordingly, if
Section 57-9(A) is to pass constitutional muster, it must do so as a special
statute.

289. Kedroff v. St. Nicholas Cathedral, 344 U.S. 94, 116 (1952) (alteration in original).
290. Reid v. Gholson, 229 Va. 179, 189, 327 S.E.2d 107, 113 (1985) (citing Serb. Orthodox Diocese v.
Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724–25 (1976); Green v. Lewis, 221 Va. 547, 549 272 S.E.2d 181, 181–82
(1980)).
291. Bowie v. Murphy, 271 Va. 126, 133, 624 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2006) (citing Reid, 229 Va. at 187, 327
S.E.2d at 111–12).
292. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 458–59; McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1875 (citing Jones v. Wolf,
443 U.S. 595, 600–01, 604 (1979)). Indeed, several statutes similar to Section 57-9(A) have been struck
down as unconstitutional. See Goodson v. Northside Bible Church, 261 F. Supp. 99, 104 (S.D. Ala.
1966) (finding a statute unconstitutional that allowed sixty-five percent of a local church in
disagreement with a parent church to separate from the parent church and retain control over church
property); Sustar v. Williams, 263 So. 2d 537, 543 (Miss. 1972) (finding a statute unconstitutional that
allowed a two-thirds majority of congregation to obtain control and authority over trust property when a
schism occurred between beneficiaries and church authorities).
293. Wallace v. Hughes, 131 Ky. 445, 469–70, 115 S.W. 684, 691 (1909) (explaining that “religious
organizations are merely voluntary associations, whose constitutions and laws are in their ultimate
result, so far as the civil tribunals are concerned, in the nature of contracts between the members”).
294. In re Episcopal Church Cases, 45 Cal. 4th 467, 489, 198 P.3d 66, 82 (2009).
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2. Section 57-9(A) as a Special Statute
Another method of approaching Section 57-9(A) is to categorize it as a
special statute that governs “church property arrangements in a manner that
precludes state interference in doctrine.”295 As noted above, there is no
Supreme Court opinion setting aside special statutes as a third constitutional
approach for resolving church property disputes.296 The precedential origin
for this approach is a concurring opinion written by Justice Brennan in
Churches of God. 297 Some commentators argue the concept of special
statutes as a third approach to resolving church property disputes is moot as
a result of subsequent developments in Supreme Court jurisprudence since
that case.298 Accordingly, courts remain unclear as to whether special
statutes are a separate approach for resolving church property disputes unto
themselves or a subcategory of neutral principles of law.299 As a result,
there is no clear standard—if special statutes are categorically different than
neutral principles of law—as to how they must be crafted to satisfy First
Amendment requirements.300 The clearest guidance available in this respect
is found in Justice Brennan’s concurring opinion in Churches of God.301
Justice Brennan explained that for such statutes to be constitutional, they
“must be carefully drawn to leave control of ecclesiastical policy, as well as
doctrine, to church governing bodies.”302
Per the Supreme Court of Virginia’s holding in Truro, a congregation of
a hierarchical church may divest the church of its property rights if it
establishes: (a) that a division occurred within the hierarchical church; (b)
the congregation was attached to the church at the time of the division; (c)
the congregation separated from the church and voted to align itself with a
“branch” of the church that experienced the division.303 It is important to
295.
296.
297.
298.

Churches of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
See supra Part I.
Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1887. McCarthy explains that:
The concurrence was written prior to the Court's statement in Jones v. Wolf that tied the
protection of free exercise rights to “neutral provisions of state law governing the manner
in which churches own property.” It was also written prior to Employment Division v.
Smith, an opinion that substantially altered the Court's approach to the Free Exercise
Clause. Finally, Justice Brennan's statement does not necessarily sanction treating
religious and secular voluntary associations differently, nor does it suggest that a state
might distinguish between denominations.
Id. (internal citations omitted).
299. Bishop & Diocese of Colo. v. Mote, 716 P.2d 85, 91 n.6 (Colo. 1986).
300. Id.
301. Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
302. Id. (citing Kedroff v. St. Nichols Cathedral. 344 U.S. 94 (1952)).
303. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 21-22, 694 S.E.2d 555, 563 (2010)
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note that the “division” need not occur in accordance with church polity and
the “branch” need not operate under the same polity.304 Thus, Section 579(A) strips governing bodies of hierarchical churches of control over
matters of ecclesiastical policy and doctrine.305 Namely, the statute divests
the governing body of hierarchical churches of the ability to configure their
own structure without facing a very real risk of losing significant church
property to a dissident congregation.306 Accordingly, Section 57-9(A) does
not meet the requirement of being “carefully drawn to leave control of
ecclesiastical policy, as well as doctrine, to church governing bodies.”307
Indeed, the manner in which a church arranges for its property to be held
is a central issue to the church’s internal structure.308 The Court’s reasoning
in Kreshik v. Saint Nicholas Cathedral supports this conclusion.309 In that
case, the Court invalidated a statute purporting to transfer control of church
property from one hierarchical religious entity to another hierarchical
religious entity. 310 In holding the statute unconstitutional, the Court
explained “the right conferred under canon law... to [use and occupy church
property] was ‘strictly a matter of ecclesiastical government,’ and... could
not constitutionally be impaired by a statute purporting to bestow that right
on another.”311
Thus, even as a special statute, Section 57-9(A)
unconstitutionally invades the province of religious governing bodies
because “the reorganization of [a hierarchical religious body] involves a
matter of internal church government, an issue at the core of ecclesiastical
affairs.”312
Section 57-9’s encroachment on structural control that is properly left to
the governing bodies of hierarchical religious institutions seems to stray
outside what the First Amendment will tolerate of any special statute.
Kedroff is illustrative of this principle.313 That case involved a statute that
purported to divest the governing body of the Russian Orthodox Church in
Moscow of its control over local churches in the United States.
Furthermore, the statute transferred vested control over the local churches
from the governing body of the church in Russia to the governing

304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.
311.
312.
313.

Id. at 26, 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 556, 567.
Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 457–58.
Id. at 458–59.
Churches of God, 396 U.S. at 370 (Brennan, J., concurring).
Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 459.
363 U.S. 190, 190 (1960).
Id. at 190–91.
Id.
Serb. Orthodox Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 721 (1976).
344 U.S. at 94. For a complete discussion of this issue, see McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1887–88.
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authorities located stateside.314 The Court explained that the statute
operated to pass “control of matters strictly ecclesiastical from one church
authority to another. It thus intrudes for the benefit of one segment of a
church the power of the state into the forbidden area of religious freedom
contrary to the principles of the First Amendment.”315 In other words, the
Court held that religious bodies are constitutionally entitled to freely
exercise their religious beliefs in regards to their own structure,
administration, and operation.316 The First Amendment requires that these
institutions be allowed to decide for themselves how they will resolve
matters of church government, faith, and doctrine without interference from
the state.317 Even when viewed as a special statute specifically meant to
address church property disputes, Section 57-9(A) impermissibly divests
the governing bodies of religious institutions of “control of ecclesiastical
policy” in violation of the First Amendment.318
C. Navigating the Ecclesiastical Collision in the Future
If there is one thing that Truro did make clear, it is that Section 57-9(A)
is not the only principle of law Virginia courts may turn to in attempting to
resolve a hierarchical church property dispute.319 Indeed, the court
established that such disputes may be resolved by use of contract and
property law.320 Accordingly, it is possible that future church disputes
litigated in Virginia courts may run their course without triggering the
statute. Rather a court may find the statute inapplicable for one of several
reasons and then turn to contract and property to law as the controlling
doctrines in the case.321 To illustrate this point, a Virginia court confronted

314. 344 U.S. at 119.
315. Id. at 119.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Churches of God, 396 U.S. 367, 370 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
319. Truro, 280 Va. 6, 29, 694 S.E.2d 555, 567 (2010); Chambers & McBeth, supra note 151, at 150,
166–67.
320. Truro, 280 Va. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567; Chambers & McBeth, supra note 151, at 146, 150, 161.
321. Truro, 280 Va. at 21–22, 694 S.E.2d at 563. The court established the following factual
prerequisites that a congregation must establish to avoid itself of Section 57-9(A):
There has been a “division . . . in a church or religious society to which any such
congregation . . . is attached.” Likewise, the authority afforded by the statute permitting
such congregations to vote in order to determine “to which branch of the church or
society such congregation shall thereafter belong” must be construed within the context
of the first phrase of the statute. That is, the “branch of the church or society” to which
the congregation votes to belong must be a branch of the “church or religious society to
which [the petitioning congregation] is attached” prior to the “division.”
Id. If a congregation failed to establish one of these elements, a court could find the statute inapplicable
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with a hierarchical church property dispute should follow the analytical
model set forth in Truro and first attempt to apply Section 57-9(A).322 If the
court finds the statute inapplicable, it should next turn to neutral principles
of law—such as property law and contract law—as the law governing the
outcome of the case.323 If applying neutral principles of law implicates
ecclesiastical questions, the court should then defer to the outcome
proposed by the adjudicatory body of the hierarchical church involved.324
Not every possible application of Section 57-9(A) to hierarchical church
property disputes will trigger all of the constitutional issues that were
identified in Part III.325 One constitutional issue that will always be present
when applying the statute is whether the court can determine whether one
church is a branch of another church without becoming enmeshed in the
ecclesiastical thicket.326
Going forward, the most constitutionally
problematic scenario is one in which a congregation separates from a parent
church and realigns itself with a branch of the parent church that is not
subject to the governing body of the parent church. This scenario is
completely plausible given that the Supreme Court of Virginia held that
operation as a separate polity would not necessarily bar a given religious
organization from qualifying as a branch of a church or religious society
that experienced division.327 A successful Section 57-9(A) petition under
this fact pattern would strip one hierarchical church of its property rights
and redistribute those rights to a completely different religious organization.
This scenario would open the door for the hierarchical church deprived of
its property to argue that Section 57-9 violates the requirement of
government neutrality towards religion by operating as a government
preference for congregational churches and by inhibiting the hierarchical
church’s free exercise rights to structure its property holdings in a manner
that, but for the statute, would legally ensure that the faction loyal to the
church retained control of the property.328

and defer to property law and contract law as the court in Truro did. See id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567.
322. Truro, 280 Va. at 19, 694 S.E.2d at 562 (citing Davenport v. Little-Bowser, 269 Va. 546, 557, 611
S.E.2d 366, 372 (2005)).
323. Id. at 29, 694 S.E.2d at 567 (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 57-7.1 (Repl. Vol. 2007)).
324. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 726-27 (1871).
325. Truro, 280 Va. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 567.
326. See supra Part III.A.
327. Truro, 280 Va. at 28–29, 694 S.E.2d at 567.
328. Bd. of Educ. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 703 (1994) (stating that the principle of government
neutrality towards religion is at the heart of the Establishment Clause); Jones, 443 U.S. at 603
(explaining that the neutral principles of law doctrine does not implicate free exercise issues because a
hierarchical church will be able to ensure the faction loyal to the church because civil courts are bound
to give effect to any such arrangement made in some legally cognizable form); see supra Part III.A–B.
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In the event that a court is called upon to apply Section 57-9(A) in such a
scenario, it may be able to avoid some of the statute’s constitutional
infirmities by categorizing Section 57-9(A) as a neutral principle of law—
specifically, a presumptive rule of majority representation—and interpreting
the Supreme Court’s holding in Jones as merely requiring states to provide
an “escape hatch” for hierarchical churches to ensure they can overcome the
presumptive rule of majority representation.329 Such an interpretation
would arguably enable a court to justify holding the statute constitutional by
resolving free exercise concerns surrounding the statute. Namely, the
“escape hatch” reading of Jones provides that a hierarchical church’s free
exercise rights are not violated by the application of the presumptive rule of
majority representation as long as there is some method to overcome the
presumption.330 Given that Virginia allows hierarchical churches to avoid
the application of Section 57-9(A)’s presumptive rule of majority
representation in a property dispute by titling the property in the name of an
ecclesiastical officer,331 a court could hold a sufficient “escape hatch” exists
to find the statute constitutional.332 Indeed, the circuit court in Truro used a
similar reasoning in response to TEC and the Diocese’s constitutional
challenges of Section 57-9(A).333
Ultimately, however, courts should not find Section 57-9 to be
constitutional for several reasons. First, evaluating whether one church is
sufficiently derived from another so as to qualify the former as a branch of
the latter raises Establishment Clause concerns by requiring the court to
examine prior religious affiliations between the two entities. Such an
analysis is likely to place the court in a position necessitating the
interpretation of religious canons that govern such relationships.
Additionally, Section 57-9 violates the principle of government neutrality
towards all forms of religion. Section 57-9(B) expressly applies to
congregational churches because it only applies to a church “entirely
independent of any other church or general society.” Section 57-9(A), by
practical implication of 57-9(B)’s language, governs church property
disputes in hierarchical churches—those churches not governed that are not
“entirely independent of any other church or general society.” The former
defers to the property dispute resolution procedures of a congregational
church, while the latter ignores a hierarchical church’s property dispute
resolution procedures and imposes a rule of congregational majority vote on

329.
330.
331.
332.
333.

McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1873.
See supra text accompanying notes 269–74.
VA. CODE ANN. § 57-15 (Repl. Vol. 2007).
Id.
See In re Multi-Circuit Episcopal II, 76 Va. Cir. 894, 923–24 (Va. Cir. Ct. 2009).
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hierarchical churches. As to the “escape hatch” reading of Jones—the
reading necessary to prevent Section 57-9(A) from violating a hierarchical
church’s free exercise rights—such a reading views one statement of the
opinion out of context and renders the majority opinion inconsistent.334
Furthermore, even if the “escape hatch” reading of Jones were correct,
Section 57-9(A) lacks sufficient flexibility towards all forms of religious
government to qualify as a constitutional neutral principle of law that can
be applied to resolve church property disputes.335 Admittedly, it is well
settled that statutes should be interpreted and applied so as to preserve their
constitutionality.336 This rule of statutory interpretation notwithstanding,
courts should not go to extreme or extraordinary lengths to apply Section
57-9(A) in whatever way best preserves constitutionality.337 Rather, the
Virginia courts should welcome the coming ecclesiastical collision as an
opportunity to purge the Virginia Code of a statute that is not consistent
with the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution.
IV. CONCLUSION
Church property disputes are rife with lurking ecclesiastical issues that
are outside the jurisdiction of the civil courts.338 Churches are being forced
to wrestle with difficult doctrinal questions because of trending changes in
the overall political temperament of the general United States’
population.339 Accordingly, the internal disputes within a religious
organization that arise from church leadership revisiting and changing
positions on issues such as homosexual marriage and ordainment of
homosexual ministers are only expected to increase in the future.340 An
increase in such disputes will also cause an increase in church property
litigation as more congregations splinter. This Article examined the

334. McCarthy, supra note 22, at 1875.
335. Schmalzbach, supra note 5, at 458–59.
336. Commonwealth v. Doe, 278 Va. 223, 229, 682 S.E.2d 906, 908 (2009); Marshall v. N. Transp.
Auth., 275 Va. 419, 428, 657 S.E.2d 71, 75 (2008) (noting that courts interpret statutory language in a
manner that avoids a constitutional question); Kolpalchick v. Catholic Diocese of Richmond, 274 Va.
332, 340, 645 S.E.2d 439, 443 (2007) (stating that the General Assembly intends to enact statutes that
comply with the Constitution in every respect).
337. See Chambers & McBeth, supra note 151, at 150.
338. E.g., Bowie v. Murphy, 271 Va. 127, 133, 624 S.E.2d 74, 78 (2006) (church deacon brought action
against pastor and other church members for assault and defamation).
339. See Lampman, supra note 1.
340. Id.
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constitutional standards surrounding various courses of action states may
pursue to resolve these types of property disputes and provided a specific
analysis on Virginia’s statutory scheme for doing so.341
The law in Virginia regulating church property disputes is on a path
leading to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision. While that collision will
likely occur sooner than later, it is not a question of “if,” it is only a
question of “when.” The wreckage that follows the collision may bring one
of several potential changes to the law. The General Assembly may attempt
to draft a new statute to govern hierarchical churches that falls within
constitutional boundaries or the courts may simply turn to neutral principles
of law—such as contract and property law—from that day forward.342 It is
also possible—albeit unlikely, given there is no strong history of this
practice in Virginia—that courts will more frequently defer to the internal
adjudication of such disputes so as to avoid another ecclesiastical
collision.343
Ultimately, Section 57-9 will not survive the coming collision. Although
it is interesting to speculate what form Virginia law governing church
property disputes will take from the post-collision wreckage, this is a
question that can only be answered in time. In the end, however, Virginia
will only gain from this change in the law. Portions of the Virginia Code
not in accordance with the U.S. Constitution will be put to rest, and courts
will be empowered to resolve church property disputes because the
difference between a church property dispute and any other property dispute
will no longer exist. Instead, courts will be guided by uniform legal
principles that are applicable in any property dispute. The fact that Virginia
is on the road to an unavoidable ecclesiastical collision is not something to
be feared. Rather, it is something to be appreciated as it brings with it new
and exciting developments to Virginia law.

341. See supra Parts II–III.
342. Id.
343. Watson v. Jones, 80 U.S. 679, 734-35 (1871).

